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DEATH AND SUBORDINATION UNDER 
ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE: SENIOR BUYERS AND SENIOR LIEN 
CREDITORS 
David Gray Carlson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The ancient Greeks imagined Hypnos, the God of sleep, to be the 
brother of Thanatos, the God of death. Superficial similarities be­
tween death and sleep may have led to the Greek myth, but we can be 
confident that the Greeks ultimately understood the difference and 
therefore generally prevented the myth from intruding upon reality. 
The drafters of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UGG),' in 
contrast, did not. They confounded provisions that kill security inter­
ests with provisions that merely put such interests to sleep, i.e., subor­
dinate them pending some future awakening. Although courts gener­
ally have not been misled by this confusion, the rationale behind 
disregarding the plain language of the UGG should be set forth. In 
addition, the drafters failed to specify whether the enforcement of 
liens outside of Article 9 should kill off Article 9 security interests—a 
serious failure that has misled several courts. The purpose of this 
Article is to identify those situations in which security interests should 
he considered subordinated to the interests of lien creditors and buy­
ers, and those in which security interests should be considered elimi­
nated altogether. 
I. SENIOR BUYERS 
A comparison between section 9-301 and section 9-307(1) will 
make the point with regard to buyers. Section 9-307(1) is that all-
important provision governing sales in the ordinary course of business. 
Such a sale (by anyone but a farmer selling farm products) kills any 
security interest created by the seller. This can be seen from the 
drafters' use of the term "takes free": "A buyer in ordinary course of 
business . . . takes free of a security interest created by his seller even 
though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; 
B.S., 1974, University of California at Santa Barbara; J.D., 1977, Hastings College of the Law, 
University of California. 
' Unless otherwise indicated, citations are to the 1978 version of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC). 
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knows of its existence."^ The basic idea is expressed clearly enough. 
After a sale to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, any security 
interest in the goods sold ceases to exist. The death penalty is imposed 
upon security interests that are, for whatever reason, junior to the 
rights of these buyers. They are dead, and appropriately so. 
Section 9-301 (l)(c) expresses the subordination idea. This section 
provides: 
[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of 
(c) in the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel 
paper, a person who is not a secured party and who is a transferee 
in hulk or other buyer not in ordinary course of business or is a 
buyer of farm products in ordinary course of business, to the extent 
that he gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without 
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. 
This provision deals predominantly with buyers who are not protected 
by the death-dealing section 9-307(1).® As against unperfected security 
interests, the language of section 9-301 (l)(c) indicates that the buyer's 
rights (whatever they may be) are merely senior to the secured party's 
rights, provided both payment and receipt of possession by the buyer 
occur at a time when the buyer has the requisite ignorance. Subordi­
nation is not death, or at least not obviously so. Most people would 
assume that a junior security interest is distinguishable from no secur­
ity interest. Perhaps the security interest lives on. Thus, whereas 
section 9-307(1) kills perfected security interests, section 9-301 (l)(c) 
may allow unperfected security interests to survive. 
The consequences of maintaining that subordination is not death 
are far from trivial. Take, for example, the case of a buyer out of the 
ordinary course of business who buys personal property without 
U.C.C. § 9-307(1). 
' The reference to "goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper," id. § 9-307(l)(c), is 
designed to exclude intangible property, which is covered under section 9-301(l)(d). The sepa­
rate treatment of intangibles is related to the ignorance requirements imposed upon the buyer. In 
the case of tangibles, the buyer needs to he ignorant of the unperfected security interest both at 
the time he gives value and at the time he takes delivery. In the case of intangibles, there is 
nothing to deliver; thus the buyer need only he ignorant at the time he gives value. 
Section 9-301(l)(c) also excludes secured parties, for whom separate priority rules are set 
forth in section 9-312. Without this exclusion, it might be thought that secured parties are 
purchasers and therefore governed by section 9-301(l)(c). See id. § 1-201(32), (33). 
Buyers in the ordinary course of business who take farm goods are included because they are 
not eligible for the more sweeping treatment of section 9-307(1). Section 9-301(l)(c) gives at least 
partial protection (against unperfected security interests only) to such buyers in the ordinary 
course. 
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knowledge of an unperfected security interest. Such a buyer is senior 
under section 9-301 (I) (c), but what does this seniority mean? In rec­
ognition of a buyer's right to use and enjoyment of what be buys, 
courts permit the senior buyer to fend off any attempt by the secured 
party to repossess after the seller-debtor has defaulted.^ The right to 
use and enjoyment implies the right to depreciate the property, or to 
destroy it altogether. Presumably, the secured party, since be is junior 
to the buyer's rights, has no standing to object.® Finally, the buyer has 
the right to encumber bis property or sell it to another purchaser. It is 
here that the sleeping security interest might come to life. Suppose the 
second buyer has acquired knowledge of the unperfected security 
interest, or suppose that after the sale the secured party perfected his 
interest with a filing. If the security interest is not dead after the first 
sale, the second buyer would be ineligible for the protection of section 
9-30I(I)(c) and accordingly would be junior to the security interest. If 
this were the rule, the first buyer would find that he holds encum­
bered property worth a good deal less in the marketplace than compa­
rable unencumbered property.® 
The possibility that the secured interest might survive against a 
senior buyer's subsequent transferees is a serious matter for merchants 
who deal with trade-ins. Section 9-307(1) clearly kills security inter­
ests created by the selling merchant himself. It does not, however, kill 
security interests created by customers who trade in encumbered 
goods to the selling merchant. The buying merchant therefore must 
rely upon some other provision to establish his immunity from the 
unperfected secured party. Thus, in Victory National Bank v. Ste­
wart,'' the buying used car dealer successfully established his seniority 
over the unperfected secured party by means of section 9-301 (I)(c).® 
* See, e.g., McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (buyer out of the 
ordinary course); White Star Distrib., Inc. v. Kennedy, 66 A.D.2d 1011, 411 N.Y.S.2d 751 
(1978) (same); Klbbe v. Rohde, 285 Pa. Super. 379, 427 A.2d 1163 (1981) (farm equipment); 
Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1971) (dictum). 
' A senior secured party can sue for conversion after default if the junior buyer interferes 
with the secured party's right of possession. Nickles, Enforcing Article 9 Security Interests 
Against Subordinate Buyers of Collateral, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 511, 520 (1982). 
° Under this view of section 9-301(l)(c), the senior buyer is in a position analogous to a 
homesteader in those states where a judgment lien on the homestead springs up immediately 
upon the homesteader's attempt to sell his property. See, e.g.. Sample v. Jackson, 225 N.C. 380, 
35 S.E.2d 236 (1945). Such a homestead system destroys the homesteader's ability to sell his 
property to another. See Fleischhauer v. Bilstad, 233 Or. 578, 379 P.2d 880 (1963) (en banc). 
' 6 Kan. App. 2d 847, 636 P.2d 788 (1981). 
' As to cars, most states have superseded Article 9 to varying degrees with certificate of title 
legislation. States that have enacted the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-
Theft Act, 11 U.L.A. 427 (1974), see, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 2101-2135 (McKinney 
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What remains unsettled after Victory National Bank is the title that 
the used car dealer will be able to convey to a later customer.® 
Cases proving or disproving the car dealer's ability to convey 
good title simply do not exist. The cases establishing that the junior 
secured party may not replevy goods or recover in conversion from the 
senior buyer prove only that the buyer's "senior rights" include the 
right to use and enjoyment of the collateral free of the secured party's 
rights under part 5 of Article 9.'^ This principle is not the same as the 
death of the security interest altogether. Although courts occasionally 
consider the rights of buyers several times removed from the first 
buyer, they fail to distinguish between remote buyers who indepen­
dently qualify for protection from unperfected security interests under 
section 9-301 (l)(c) and remote buyers who do not qualify under that 
section but nevertheless prevail because the security interest died 
Supp. 1983), have provisions that govern the effect of unperfected security interests. Thus, in 
New York, "a security interest in a vehicle of a type for which a certificate of title is required is 
not valid against creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lienholders of the vehicle 
without knowledge of the security interest unless perfected as provided in this section." Id. § 
2118(a). This sounds like language of death ("not valid") and therefore seems more conducive 
than section 9-301(l)(c) to an easy holding that the unperfected security interest was killed when 
a used car dealer purchased without knowledge. Nevertheless, the question remains as to what 
happens when the dealer sells to a customer with knowledge, or when the junior secured party 
attempts to force the issuance of a new certificate that reflects his lien. As to such parties, the 
uniform legislation merely hints at death, failing to state succinctly that the security interest is 
nonexistent when the used car dealer sells to a second buyer with knowledge of the car's history. 
In other states, legislation pertaining to certificates of title does not attempt to govern the 
effectiveness of unperfected security interests. See 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal 
Property § 20.6, at 568 (1965). Presumably, such states would rely upon section 9-301(l)(c) to 
supply the rule, again raising the distinction between death and subordination. 
Still other states have no specific certificate of title acts, at least as pertains to highway 
vehicles. This is the case in Kansas, the state where Victory Natl Bank was decided. See Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 8-135 (1982). Thus, the UGG controls, and the death versus subordination issue 
must be confronted. 
® The seller's power to convey title is addressed in section 2-403(1), which states; "A 
purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that 
a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased." Any 
attempt to create a shelter rule out of this section would be misguided since the determination of 
whether the seller can convey good title directly depends upon the meaning of section 9-301. 
More important, section 2-402(3)(a) provides; "Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair 
the rights of creditors of the seller . . . under . . . Article 9." Hence, if section 9-301 preserves 
some rights in a junior secured party, nothing in Article 2 can be deemed to destroy those rights. 
Some courts have stated casually that senior buyers "take free" of unperfected security 
interests under section 9-301(l)(c). E.g., In re Miguel, 30 Bankr. 896, 898 (Bankr. E.D. Gal. 
1983). However, these courts have not put this proposition to the test of multiple buyers. E.g., 
id. 
" Part 5 of Article 9, U.G.G. §§ 9-501 to -507, deals with the secured party's right of 
repossession. 
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when the first buyer was protected by section 9-301 (I) (c)d^ It is 
therefore impossible to ascertain the true meaning of these decisions. 
Commentators likewise fail to note the distinction between subordina­
tion and death,'® and even the authors of the official comments of the 
UCC assume that death and subordination are indistinguishable. 
" See, e.g.. White Star Dlstrib., Inc. v. Kennedy, 66 A.D.2d 1011, 411 N.Y.S.2d 751 
(1978). 
For a ease full of ambiguities on the meaning of section 9-301(l)(c), see Fas-Pac, Inc. v. 
Fillingame, 123 Ga. App. 203, 180 S.E.2d 243 (1971). There, a judicial lien creditor (Inman) 
was also the buyer at the sheriffs sale. In both capacities, Inman was without knowledge of an 
unperfected security interest in the collateral. Later, Inman sold the collateral to a third party 
whose extent of knowledge was not disclosed by the court. The unperfected secured party then 
sought to enforce her security interest against the third party. Enforcement was denied for 
reasons that are unclear. The opinion indicates that the secured party was unsuccessful because 
Inman had no knowledge of the security interest at the time he became a lien creditor (which 
established seniority under the 1962 version of section 9-301(l)(b)). Id. at 203, 180 S.E.2d at 244. 
However, the court explicitly stated; "The rights of the claimant are derived from Inman, as the 
lien creditor and purchaser at the judicial sale, and are therefore superior . . . ."Id. 
The opinion can be read in three distinct ways. First, the security interest may have been 
foreclosed by the sheriffs sale, pursuant to nonuniform lien law. But see U.C.C. § 9-201 (a 
security interest survives unless a UCC provision says otherwise); infra text accompanying notes 
111-35 (discussing whether nonuniform lien law forecloses security interests). Second, the buyer 
at the sheriffs sale may have "taken free" of the security interest, so that by the time the third 
party bought the property, the security interest had already been extinguished. Third, it is 
possible that the third party was also a buyer without knowledge of the unperfected security 
interest. As such, the third party would be entitled to the protection of section 9-301 (l)(c), even 
under the narrow view of that provision described in the text. One might argue that this last 
interpretation is untenable because the court indicates that the third party's rights were "de­
rived" from Inman as a buyer. However, the opinion fails to address Inman's knowledge at the 
time of the initial purchase as well as the third party's knowledge at the time of the later 
purchase. Thus, without more information, it is difficult to determine what the court meant by 
invoking the concept of derivation. 
" Among the works that do not distinguish between death and subordination in Article 9 
are R. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 8-3, 
at 302 (2d ed. 1979); J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code § 25-2, at 902 (1972) (section 9-301(1) subordinates, rather than extinguishes, 
a security interest); Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 512 (1973); Kripke, 
Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 44, 57 (1964) ("the conse­
quences of failure to perfect under Section 9-301 are . . . invalidity against a purchaser from . . . 
the debtor"); Nickles, supra note 5, at 521. 
Professor Kripke criticizes section 9-301(l)(c), N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-301 practice commentary at 
428 (McKinney 1964) ("it is hard to conceive of more confusing draftsmanship"), but fails to note 
that the section does not terminate the security interest. In the end he concludes that "[i]t all adds 
up to the right answer." Id. 
" Section 9-301 states when transferees take free of unperfected security interests. 
Sections 9-307 on goods, 9-308 on chattel paper and instruments and 9-309 on 
negotiable instruments, negotiable documents and securities state when purchasers 
of such collateral take free of a security interest even though perfected and even 
though the disposition was not authorized. 
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Only one court has come even close to holding that an unper-
fected security interest survives a sale to a senior buyer. In United 
Rental Equipment Co. v. Potts 6- Callahan Contracting Co.,^^ an 
unperfected secured party tried to assert its security interest against a 
senior buyer. As a result of its assertion, a second buyer was scared 
away. The first buyer then sued the unperfected secured party for 
malicious interference with contractual relations. The court, noting 
that the allegation required proof of bad faith, refused to find any 
grounds for the suit. The court's refusal comports with the notion that 
subordination, rather than death, is a reasonable reading of the plain 
language of section 9-301. The court, unlike the first buyer, obviously 
thought that the security interest was not so clearly dead and buried.^® 
Although language of subordination may be ambiguous in the 
context of senior buyers, it is well suited and thoroughly appropriate 
for priorities between lienors. A lien is merely the right to apply the 
property toward the payment of a money debt. The usual method of 
enforcement is sale of the collateral.''' The lien creditor gets first 
priority to the cash proceeds of the sale (after the selling expenses of 
the enforcing agent, of course)'® and the debtor gets the surplus. 
Subordinated lienors, if they exist, come before the debtor in their 
right to receive cash proceeds.'® Thus, junior liens clearly are not 
eliminated altogether by the senior lien. For this reason, language of 
subordination, as opposed to language of death, is important to lien 
systems. Unfortunately, Article 9 contains many provisions where 
such language goes beyond lien priorities and describes the rights of 
buyers as well.®" 
Section 9-301 is the most significant section in which this over­
reaching occurs. Section 9-301 started its life as a catalogue of all the 
U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3. This remark provides good evidence that the drafters of Article 9 did 
not contemplate any difference between death and subordination, at least with regard to senior 
buyers. 
" 231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963). 
At one point the court does refer to the senior buyer's "good title." Id. at 559, 191 A.2d at 
574. However, the court emphasizes the junior secured party's lack of malice and right to pursue 
its interest as the reasons for the tort suit's failure. 
" See U.C.C. § 9-504(1). Occasionally, lien statutes contemplate strict foreclosure, 
whereby the lienor simply retains the collateral in satisfaction of the underlying debt. E.g., id. § 
9-505(2). 
See id. § 9-504(1) (a)-(b). 
See id. § 9-504(1) (c). 
For the purposes of this Article, the term "lienor" will be used to describe generally any 
party with a right to have the property sold in enforcing a debt. The term "lien creditor" will 
follow the Article 9 definition of judicial lien creditor only. See id. § 9-301(3). The term "secured 
party" will refer, of course, to a lienor with a consensual Article 9 interest. See id. § 9-105(m). 
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property interests that could be senior to unperfected security inter­
ests.^' Because the drafters saw no difference between death and 
subordination, they found it grammatically convenient to include 
judicial lien creditors, secured parties and buyers as among those to 
whom an unperfected secured party might be "subordinate." A better 
approach would have been to separate buyers and lienors, affording 
each distinct treatment. 
The same drafting problem can be found elsewhere in the UCC; 
section 9-308, pertaining to chattel paper, and section 9-312, as it 
pertains to the sale of accounts, are noteworthy examples. Largely to 
reflect the realities of nonrecourse financing of receivables, the draft­
ers chose to treat buyers of accounts and chattel paper as secured 
parties under Article 9, rather than buyers under Article 2 or the 
common law of assignments.^^ Nevertheless, the distinction between a 
straight sale and a secured transaction should have been upheld here 
as well. A buyer of chattel paper or accounts essentially is speculating 
on collecting more than he pays for the account. Since he expects to 
collect each and every penny the account debtor owes to the debtor, 
there is nothing left for any other secured party who claims to be 
junior to the buyer of the chattel paper. Therefore, language of death 
would have been appropriate. Language of subordination would 
make sense only if there were a chance of a surplus, in which case the 
respective rights of debtors and junior lienors would be of impor­
tance.^® 
A variation of this drafting problem exists in section 9-313, which 
pertains to fixtures. This section indiscriminately mixes the language 
of death and subordination. Section 9-313(2) provides that "no secur­
ity interest exists" in "ordinary building materials incorporated into an 
improvement on land." This language clearly kills security interests on 
See id. § 9-301 comment I ("This section lists the classes of persons who take priority over 
an unperfected security interest."). The initial purpose of section 9-301 has been abrogated to 
some degree by the 1972 addition of section 9-301(4) (future advances), which deals only with 
the rights of lien creditors against perfected security interests. See Carlson & Shupack, Judicial 
Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (pt. 1), 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 287, 
317-19 (1984). 
See U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b). 
Despite this drafting ambiguity, it does not appear as though any great harm is done in 
this case. Since buyers of accounts and chattel paper are Article 9 secured parties, remote buyers 
are effectively sheltered from a reversal of priorities by section 9-302(2)—an advantage not 
supplied explicitly to other buyers. 
Buyers of accounts and chattel paper, because they are considered secured parties, are 
treated differently from buyers of general intangibles, who are not secured parties. Thus, buyers 
of intangibles can establish their senior status as soon as they give value. Id. § 9-301(l)(d). Buyers 
of accounts, however, cannot become senior until they file. Id. § 9-312(5). 
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behalf of real estate buyers. Rut in using the language of death, the 
drafters went too far. It does not follow that death is appropriate as 
against senior lienors, such as mortgagees. In a mortgage foreclosure 
sale, a secured party holding an interest in lumber should have a 
better claim to a surplus than the debtor. There can be little doubt 
that section 9-313(2) was drafted with section 9-313(8) in mind. Sec­
tion 9-313(8) gives a secured party the power to remove fixtures (if he 
compensates the landowner) whenever the security interest is senior. 
The drafters did not want secured parties to recover the bricks and 
beams out of buildings. A middle course could have been adopted, 
however. Secured parties claiming bricks and beams could have been 
given seniority in a mortgage foreclosure sale but no power to remove. 
The remaining fixture provisions also do not draw the proper 
distinction between death and subordination. In section 9-313(4), 
purchasers are lumped with mortgagees and other lienors. As against 
these purchasers, security interests are "subordinated," rather than 
killed. Section 9-314, pertaining to accession of collateral into unen­
cumbered goods, makes the same error. 
Alongside sections that treat purchasers and lien creditors as if 
there were no differences between them, there are other sections that 
successfully segregate lien creditors and purchasers, without making 
the basic error of subordinating on behalf of the former or killing on 
hehalf of the latter. In section 9-307, for example, only the rights of 
buyers are considered. Here, death is everywhere. Each subsection 
specifies that the buyers "take free" of the security interests, whether 
perfected or not.'^^ Death also looms in section 9-504(4), which gov­
erns enforcement sales by secured parties. Here, use of the language 
"take free" was most judicious. Without it, a foreclosure sale would 
attract no buyers, and the security interest would be of little value 
indeed.^® Language of subordination also is used aptly in sections 9-
310, -312 and -315, each dealing with priorities among lienors of 
various sorts. Finally, subordination is the terminology of section 9-
309, which preserves the rights of holders in due course and bona fide 
purchasers of instruments under Articles 3, 7 and 8. These parties are 
" Professor Gilmore criticized section 9-313(2) roughly along the same lines. He thought 
that a requirement of compensation for harm done to the land is enough to dissuade secured 
parties from disassembling buildings. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 30.3, at 811-14. Implicit in 
this view is the notion that the secured party would be accorded some sort of priority in the 
mortgage foreclosure sale. 
See infra text accompanying notes 65-88. 
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frequently buyers of instruments (although sometimes they are pledg­
ees), but the language of subordination is not inappropriate.^® 
Even though the drafters used the language of death and subordi­
nation indiscriminately, the question may be posed whether junior 
liens should survive the appearance of a senior buyer. One possible 
justification is the distinction between sales in and out of the ordinary 
course of business. Section 9-307(1) deals with merchants and their 
customers, but section 9-30I(I)(c) and some of the other provisions 
where buyers do not necessarily take free of security interests deal 
predominantly with sales outside of the ordinary course of business. It 
is conceivable that death should be the rule for ordinary course trans­
actions, to facilitate business, and subordination should be the rule for 
other circumstances where the free flow of buying and selling is 
Section 9-309 is not a paradigm of draftsmanship, although its defects are unrelated to 
the distinction between death and subordination. See Clark, Abstract Rights versus Paper Rights 
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 84 Yale L.J. 445, 453 (1975). 
In traversing the complicated terrain of section 9-309, it is important to distinguish between 
a security interest claimed in the instrument itself and a security interest in connected goods, 
e.g., where a warehouse receipt covers encumbered goods. In the first case, section 9-309 asserts 
that the rules pertaining to holders in due course prevail over the rules pertaining to the pledgee's 
rights. U.C.C. § 9-309 ("[njothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due course"). If 
the transferee is a holder in due course, he "takes free" of the pledgee's claims. See id. §§ 3-
305(1), 8-301(1). Although seemingly the language of death, sections 3-305(1) and 8-301(1) 
actually represent a type of subordination since the rights of the pledgee can still come alive 
against at least some future holders. See id. § 3-201(1) ("a transferee who has himself been a 
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a 
defense or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due 
course"); id. § 8-302(4) (same). This hybrid death-subordination concept, however, appears to 
serve the needs of commerce adequately. Section 7-502(1), on the other hand, simply grants title 
to a holder who takes a document by due negotiation, thereby leaving no surviving rights. As a 
result, the language of subordination in section 9-309 is not inappropriate because the language 
of death (or its close equivalent) in Articles 3, 7 and 8 will govern according to the particular 
context involved. 
Where the security interest is not in the instrument but in the goods covered by the 
instrument, the language of subordination is also not inappropriate. In chattel paper cases, for 
example, the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument may have bought the instrument 
outright, but is nevertheless a mere secured party with regard to the collateral backing up the 
instrument. Since he is never a buyer of the collateral per se, the language of subordination is 
deftly used. In Article 7 cases, however, section 9-309 seems subject to some ambiguity. This is 
because buyers of warehouse receipts are said to have their rights under Article 7, but are also 
said in section 9-309 to "take priority over . . . earlier security interestjs]." This apparent 
ambiguity and the unhelpful language of subordination are rectified by section 7-503(1), which 
adequately kills security interests. See Clark, supra, at 458-61. Other details of the interplay 
between Article 7 and Article 9 are expertly developed in Dolan, Good Faith Purchase and 
Warehouse Receipts; Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2, 7 and 9 of the UCC, 30 Hastings 
L.J. 1 (1978). 
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unimportant.'^'' Such a distinction is preserved elsewhere in the 
UCC.'^® For example, entrustment of goods to merchants empowers 
them to kill the property rights of the entruster, and full bona fide 
purchaser protection under Article 7 is contemplated only within the 
ordinary course of business.^® Under this view, the language of subor­
dination with regard to senior buyers out of the ordinary course of 
business can be viewed as a sort of compromise. The buyer retains the 
right to use the goods he has purchased for himself, but must give way 
to the junior secured party in case the buyer tries to sell them to a 
second buyer, provided the secured party has advertised or perfected 
his security interest by the time of the second sale."® 
Such a distinction, however, ignores the role fraudulent convey­
ance law plays in striking down secret liens. Section 2-403(1), for 
instance, provides that any seller with voidable title has the power to 
convey good title to a bona fide purchaser. This provision applies to 
merchants and nonmerchants alike. To be sure, section 2-403 does not 
contemplate the destruction of unperfected security interests. In fact, 
section 2-402(3) (a) specifically prevents application of section 2-403(1) 
against secured parties. Nevertheless, it is not atypical to consider the 
debtor to be the trustee of the secured party, with power to convey 
good title to bona fide purchasers.®' The ancient hostility toward 
secret liens has always aided all types of buyers, not out of concern 
that the stream of commerce be preserved, but out of fairness to the 
buyer with no notice of the lien. This history was never based on any 
distinction between transactions in and out of the ordinary course of 
business.®® Even within Article 9, there is considerable evidence that 
the drafters never intended to distinguish between buyers who were in 
See Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461, 467 (1967) ("due 
course holding or good faith purchase becomes a matter of importance, with respect to any type 
of property, only when that property is regularly bought and sold in a market and may be 
expected to pass from hand to hand in a series of transfers"). 
See Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (and Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 22 (discussing the distinction in 
rights between those who buy "in normal trading channels" and those who buy from "one shot" 
sellers); Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 469, 479 (1963) ("With regard to goods, the Code . . . restricts the protection of 
good faith purchasers to essentially commercial transactions."). 
U.C.C. § 7-501(4) (the phrase used in this subsection is "regular course of business"); see 
Dolan, supra note 26, at 4. 
See supra note 6. 
See Unif. Trust Receipts Act § 9(1) (a) (act withdrawn 1951, superseded by UCC). Under 
section 9(l)(a), the "trustee" had the power to convey good title to the collateral to a bona fide 
purchaser for value. 
See infra text accompanying notes 45-53. 
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or out of the ordinary course of business.''' For example, when an 
unperfected security interest is created by someone other than the 
seller, buyers in the ordinary course are unable to use section 9-307(1) 
but presumably can resort to section 9-30I(I)(c).''' Thus, section 9-
301 (I)(c) is not exclusively the province of unimportant sales out of the 
ordinary course. Any appearance that these sections can be distin­
guished on the basis of ordinary and unusual transactions is highly 
deceptive. 
What, then, should courts do about this drafting ambiguity when 
a junior secured party tries to assert that his security interest, though 
subordinate to a senior buyer, still lives? The best rule is that senior 
purchases should extinguish security interests, while senior liens 
should merely subordinate security interests in the usual sense. One 
difficulty with such a declaration, however, is that the word "subordi­
nation" will have drastically different meanings from sentence to 
sentence. In rational legislation, words should have only one meaning, 
to the extent possible." 
A second possibility is for courts to hold that transferees of the 
first buyer are "sheltered" when they buy from him, even though the 
second transferee would not otherwise qualify for protection from the 
security interest under section 9-301 (I)(c). Shelter is distinguishable 
from death to the extent that any requirements at all, such as taking 
for value, are imposed upon the transferee.'® Thus, a shelter concept 
would preserve the senior buyer's right to alienate for value, while 
preserving the possibility that the junior security interest might live 
again. 
There might, however, be an objection to introducing the less 
protective shelter concept to buyers out of the ordinary course of 
The true demarcation between these sections, however, is that section 9-301 lists interests 
that defeat unperfected security interests, while section 9-307 lists those interests that defeat 
perfected interests. 
" To be precise about the statutory language, section 9-301(l)(c) does not extend to buyers 
in the ordinary course of business, except for buyers of farm products. Meanwhile, section 9-
307(1) covers security interests created by the seller. Therefore, no section in the UCC governs a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business who buys goods encumbered by unperfected security 
interests created by someone other than the seller. Nevertheless, one can safely assume that courts 
would extend section 9-301(l)(c) to cover this important group of buyers in the ordinary course 
of business. 
" On the general failure of the UCC to achieve definitional consistency, see Mellinkoff, The 
Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185 (1967). 
" Thus, section 3-201(1) is a true shelter provision, since it is possible for third party claims 
to come back to life against at least some transferees. Section 7-504(1), on the other hand, does 
not seem to allow for this possibility, making it closer to a death provision than a shelter 
provision. See supra note 26. 
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business. The objection is that the drafters have provided shelter 
elsewhere,so that their failure to do so in section 9-301(l)(c) should 
be taken as significant. Thus, senior secured parties are specifically 
given shelter; senior buyers are not. That the omission is significant is 
bolstered by the history of the fixtures priority provision—section 9-
313. In the 1962 version, it was feared that senior mortgagees could 
not convey their priority to assignees who had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the junior secured interests. A specific shelter provision 
in section 9-313(4) was therefore added in the 1972 amendments.^® 
That the drafters added a shelter provision specifically to quell discon­
tent may suggest that their failure to do so with regard to buyers out of 
the ordinary course of business is all the more significant. These 
arguments, of course, are merely attempts to find the legislative intent 
and could be countered by contrary evidence, such as a showing that 
denial of shelter to buyers under section 9-301 (l)(c) violates the funda­
mental philosophy of the UCC priority system.®® 
In this author's opinion, there is considerable theoretical justifi­
cation for the view that subordination in sections 9-301 (l)(c) and (d) 
does imply death even if subordination in section 9-301 (l)(b) does not. 
Justification also exists for the proposition that shelter provisions 
should be read generously into the UCC whenever necessary to pro­
tect the marketability of a senior party's priority. Stated briefly, the 
justification is that the word "subordination" has always meant invali­
dation. But invalidation against lienors is only partial (to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the senior indebtedness) whereas against buyers it 
must be total. 
This can be better seen by briefly examining the origins of lien 
priorities, which stem from two principles: (1) the logical concept that 
an owner can transfer to another only the rights he has in property 
and (2) fraudulent conveyance law.*® 
" See U.C.C. § 9-302(2). 
The words that achieve shelter protection for senior buyers of real estate are as follows: 
"[T]he security interest has priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the 
encumbrancer or owner . . . Id. § 9-313(4)(b); see Carlson, Fixture Priorities, 4 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 381, 403-04 (1983). 
™ Comment 1 to section 1-102 admonishes: 
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and 
policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy 
of the rule or principle in question, [and] also of the Act as a whole, and the 
application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case 
may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved. 
On the relationship between fraudulent conveyance law and priorities of chattel security 
interests, see Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of 
Article 9, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 180-81 (1983). 
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The first principle is what Professors Baird and Jackson have 
called the "derivation principle"^!—the familiar concept that the 
debtor can only convey what he has.'*^ In a case where the debtor 
conveys a first lien on property (assuming the lien was made public 
and hence is not fraudulent), the second buyer or lienor is subject to 
the first lienor's rights in all respects. Only after the first lienor satisfies 
his claim from the cash proceeds of a foreclosure sale can the second 
lienor expect to satisfy his claim. In essence, the debtor transfers no 
more than his hypothetical right to a surplus (if any) to the second 
party.'*® For our purposes, this branch of priority law is not so much 
based on the concept that the second lien or other interest is termi­
nated, but upon the idea that, as to the part of the property already 
transferred to the first lienor, the second interest never came into 
being.*'* 
The second principle, fraudulent conveyance law, contributes 
the notion that hypothecations, in the absence of public notice or 
recordation, are frauds upon subsequent creditors and are "void" 
against them. Early fraudulent conveyance statutes are phrased in 
terms of death, not subordination.*® From the earliest times, hypothe­
cations (absent a recording system or some form of notoriety) have 
been considered fraudulent against creditors,*® and these creditors 
could establish their liens against the property conveyed to the secured 
lenders as if the conveyance was "void." Classical fraudulent convey­
ance law dealt almost entirely with the rights of creditors, but in 
related areas the rights of buyers were dealt with as well. For exam­
ple, sales law has always covered the double sale of goods where the 
D. Baird & T. Jackson, Security Interests in Personal Property 141 (1984). 
« See U.C.C. § 2-403(1). 
" Of course, where the second party is a buyer, the debtor also transfers his right of 
possession pending default. 
<< See Carlson & Shupack, supra note 21, at 291-92. 
The early English statute was most effusive on this score. Fraudulent conveyances were 
to be "clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of none Effect; any Pretence, Colour, feigned 
Consideration, expressing of Use, or any other Matter or Thing to the contrary notwithstand­
ing." Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 11 (1570). 
The modern successor to this statute is to the same effect. Under section 9 of the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), creditors can have fraudulent conveyances "annulled to 
the extent necessary," or may "disregard the conveyance" and cause the sheriff to levy the 
conveyed property. 7A U.L.A. 304 (1978). 
This was the fraud involved in Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star 
Chamber 1601). Rules punishing secret hypothecations have been a part of bankruptcy legisla­
tion since 1623. See 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 342 (rev. ed. 1940) 
(eiting the version of this rule found in the English Bankruptcy Act, 1623, 6 Jac. 1, ch. 19); see 
also Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 617, 619-23 (1931) 
(discussing the history and purpose of recording systems in England and the United States). 
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first buyer leaves his purchase in the possession of the seller. When the 
seller sold again, the second buyer took rights to the goods as if the 
first buyer had authorized the second sale.'*'' Under this rule, the 
second sale was allowed to take effect as if the first sale never existed. 
The first buyer was relegated to a personal claim against the double-
dealing seller. Thus, the system contemplated the death of the first 
buyer's right to the property per se.'*® 
Some time after this law developed, legislatures began creating 
recording systems for chattel mortgages, conditional sales and other 
security devices. Once recorded, the hypothecation lost its fraudulent 
flavor. A typical formulation of the effect of filing (and failing to file) 
was as follows: 
Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mort­
gage of goods and chattels, which is not accompanied by an imme­
diate delivery, and followed by an actual and continued change of 
possession of the things mortgaged, is absolutely void as against the 
creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers 
and mortgagees in good faith and for a fair consideration, unless 
the mortgage ... is filed . . . within ten days after the making 
thereof.*® 
Although this statute has complexities not relevant here,®" its intima­
tions of death are unmistakable. The security interest under this stat­
ute is simply void.®' 
" See Cottman v. Wagner, 213 Md. 73, 130 A.2d 749 (1957); Unif. Sales Act § 25 (act 
withdrawn 1951, superseded by UCC); Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71, § 25(1). 
On the role of "entrustment" in destroying the property rights of the owner out of possession, see 
Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 608-10 (1981). 
These statutes assume that the first party is a buyer with a present right of possession, not 
a secured party with the right to possess only after default. Nevertheless, this is a distinction 
without a difference. If the buyer's greater rights were considered utterly void, then the lesser 
rights of a secured party also would have been void under these statutes. Gf. Kripke, Should 
Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Gommercial Code Apply Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 
33 Bus. Law. 153, 158 (1977) (pledgees and buyers deserve equivalent protection). 
N.Y. Lien Law § 230 (McKinney 1966) (repealed 1964). 
One ambiguity was whether such statutes voided the security interest in all cases where 
filing was beyond the grace period, or whether late recording validated the security interests 
against creditors who came into existence after recordation. See generally 1 G. Gilmore, supra 
note 8, § 16.3 (discussing diverse penalties imposed for filing after expiration period). 
Notice that even the New York chattel mortgage statute, N.Y. Lien Law § 230 (McKin­
ney 1966) (repealed 1964), failed to slam all the doors completely. The statute did not make it 
absolutely clear that a bona fide purchaser, as to whom a security interest was "void," could give 
away the collateral to a donee free of the lien. Gf. supra note 8 (New York's certificate of title 
legislation); supra text accompanying note 36 (distinguishing shelter from death). A statute that 
does terminate avoidance powers of third parties once and for all is UFCA section 9, where all 
1984] DEATH AND SUBORDINATION 561 
Voidness under these antihypothecation statutes had different 
implications for subsequent buyers and subsequent lienors. A lienor 
only looked to the hypothecated property to satisfy a fixed debt. A 
surplus was always possible, and the secured party's right to the 
surplus was obviously superior to that of the debtor. The fraudulent 
conveyance to the secured party was void, but only to the extent that 
the fraudulent conveyance interfered with the senior rights of the 
subsequent lienor. The punishment of voidness was made to fit the 
crime. This idea was later summarized by the terms "priority," "sen­
iority" and "subordination." Hence, the word "subordination" is 
merely shorthand for death in the context of liens. 
Under these chattel mortgage statutes, buyers' rights required 
total voidness. Although a search of the cases turns up nothing to 
prove this,®^ it is safe to assume that the use of the word "void" would 
undoubtedly have been taken literally. It is inconceivable that the 
courts of an earlier era, so hostile to secret liens,®® would have con­
trived a means to preserve the unperfected security interest against the 
buyer's rights when the statute proclaimed the secret lien to be void. 
It was only in the UCC that legislators changed from the lan­
guage of death to the language of subordination. Whereas the early 
lien statutes usually dealt with subsequent buyers and lienors together 
(referring to them both as "purchasers," or purchasers and creditors, 
against whom the unrecorded lien was "void"), the drafters of the 
UCG instead drafted separate priority rules, some applying only to 
buyers and some applying only to lienors. Instead of using the old 
language of invalidity, however, the drafters used a shorthand term— 
"subordination"—which seemed to describe the concept of partial 
invalidity of an unrecorded lien to a subsequent recorded lien. But the 
term, as applied to buyer priorities, is especially ambiguous, implying 
that somehow the security interest lives on, even after a buyer has 
purchased the collateral. This ambiguity is not present, of course, 
where the drafters used the words "takes free," as in section 9-307. 
Thus, it can be seen that the language of subordination histori­
cally stems from the language of death. Priority rules were based, in 
transferees of bona fide purchasers are protected, even if they are bad faith donees. 7A U.L.A. 
304 (1978); see supra note 45. Compare II U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) (1982) ("The trustee may recover 
. . . from . . . any immediate or mediate transferee of the initial transferee") with id. § 550(b)(2) 
("The trustee may not recover . . . from . . . any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of 
[a good faith transferee who took for value]."). 
The closest cases merely prove that the junior secured party cannot repossess from the 
senior buyer or sue in conversion. See, e.g., Deeley v. Dwight, 132 N.Y. 59, 30 N.E. 258 (1892). 
See 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 2.2. 
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fact, on the complete and total invalidity of secret transfers, but an 
invalidity that extended only so far as was necessary to cure the fraud. 
In the case of buyers, the proper remedy was loss of the transfer 
altogether. Hence, when modern courts interpret such terms as "sub­
ordinate" or "takes priority over" in relation to the rights of senior 
buyers, they cannot merely follow the plain meaning of the words, 
but they can, without truly doing violence to those words, terminate 
the junior security interest altogether. 
The idea that subordination implies death also means that senior 
parties should be able to convey their rights without the assignee being 
demoted in priority for failure to qualify as a bona fide purchaser. 
This might be useful for senior lienors who cannot claim to have killed 
off the junior security interest altogether. If it is true that the junior 
security interest is void as to that part of the collateral transferred to 
the senior lienor, the senior lienor can convey clean title to his as­
signee. As to that senior lien amount, there is no danger that the 
security interest could attach in any way. Thus, the senior lienor may 
assign his interest either gratuitously or to a bad faith purchaser for 
value, with the interest retaining its senior status. 
The converse proposition, however, does not necessarily follow. 
It should be possible for a junior party to convey to an assignee, who 
might then be senior to the formerly superior security interest.®^ This 
is because the security interest of necessity must be unperfected or, as 
in the case of fixtures or chattel paper, insufficiently perfected. As 
such, the security interest is fraudulent against the unwary assignee 
and should be subordinated or killed, as the case may be. For exam­
ple, a buyer or lienor who otherwise qualifies for seniority is junior if 
he has knowledge of the contents of a misfiled financing statement of 
the unperfected secured party.®® When a junior buyer or lienor who is 
subordinated because of knowledge assigns to a third party, the unin­
formed third party is entitled to the same protection from secret liens 
to which the assignor was entitled (but for his knowledge).®® Stated 
differently, the assignor himself stands in the debtor's shoes, convey­
ing all that the debtor had. Since the debtor had the power to convey 
free of prior unrecorded security interests, the assignor should have a 
similar power.®'' 
" Courts occasionally have ruled that a second transferee steps into the shoes of the first 
transferee for all purposes, so that the knowledge of the first is imputed to the second. See, e.g., 
Henry Elias Brewing Co. v. Boeger, 74 Misc. 547, 132 N.Y.S. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1911). 
== U.C.C. § 9-401(2). 
See Carlson, supra note 38, at 423-24 & 424 n.l53. 
" This issue can also be analyzed by determining who should suffer the loss when a junior 
lienor (subordinated by knowledge to an unperfected security interest) conveys to an ignorant 
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Thus, an assignment should be able to change a junior interest 
into a senior interest, but, as noted above, it should not be able to 
change a senior interest into a junior one. Assignments of rights should 
work only in favor of the assignee's priority against unperfected secur­
ity interests. 
II. SENIOR LIEN CREDITORS 
Section 9-201 is a bold piece of work. That section provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement 
is effective according to its terms between the parties, against 
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors. 
The thrust of this provision is that a security interest lives on perpetu­
ally unless a UCC provision says otherwise.®® The provision shows that 
the drafters confidently thought they could list within Article 9 every 
reason why a security interest should die. That they failed to antici­
pate each and every circumstance is patent. For example, where in 
the UCC does it state that security interests are void if they are 
fraudulent conveyances?®® Article 2 incorporates fraudulent convey-
assignee. Between the assignee and the unperfected secured party, it is the latter who caused the 
loss by failing to perfect, and hence he should bear the loss. See Phillips, The Commercial 
Culpability Scale, 92 Yale L.J. 228, 253-54 (1982). The unperfected secured party will then have 
recourse against the junior lienor for conversion since any action that destroys a senior security 
interest generates such a cause of action. But see United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 
1971) (no conversion liability where defendant destroyed senior security interest by unauthorized 
sale to senior buyer). The result in Hext allows the junior party to obtain a windfall, i.e., he 
obtains a price commensurate with senior status from the second transferee without having to 
account to the senior secured party. See Nickles, supra note 5, at 524 n.53. 
In the same vein is section 1-104: "This Act being a general act intended as a unified 
coverage of its subject matter, no part of it shall he deemed to he impliedly repealed by 
subsequent legislation if such construction can reasonably be avoided." While the sentiment 
expressed is aimed at subsequent legislation, the spirit of section 1-104 is all the more potent in 
discouraging the use of prior legislation to displace the provisions of the UCC. 
" UFCA section 7 is the provision that might best be used to void an eleventh hour security 
interest. 7A U.L.A. 242 (1978). The other avoidance sections require that the security interest be 
given without fair consideration. UFCA §§ 4-6, 7A U.L.A. 205, 237, 240. A security interest by 
definition, however, is always received in exchange for value; hence these UFCA sections wiU 
never apply. See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(b) (security interest does not attach until the secured party 
has given value). Section 7 of the UFCA, on the other hand, deems fraudulent "[ejvery convey­
ance made . . . with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, 
delay, or defraud either present or future creditors." The guilty intent must he not only in the 
debtor, but in the secured party as well, since bona fide purchasers are always protected from 
fraudulent conveyance liability. See Clark, supra note 26, at 448 n.l7. If actual fraud can be 
proven, the lien creditor can have the conveyance set aside and "annulled to the extent necessary 
to satisfy his claim." UFCA § 9(l)(a), 7A U.L.A. 304; see Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent 
Conveyances, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 495 (1983). Since the lien creditor's senior status cannot be 
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ance law by reference,®" but Article 9 does not. One might argue that 
section 1-103 fills this omission. That section provides: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the 
principles of law and equity, including . . . fraud ... or other 
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement [the UCC's] pro­
visions. 
The trouble with section 1-103 is that if rules outside the UCC are 
available by this means to destroy security interests, section 9-201 has 
no meaning at all. To the contrary, it seems as if section 9-201 
"displaces" such non-UCC rules, within the meaning of section 1-103, 
making section 1-103 useless to solve the fraudulent conveyance prob­
lem.®^ 
Nevertheless, few would assert that section 9-201 displaces fraud­
ulent conveyance law. Instead, it is obvious that section 9-201 is 
generally forgotten whenever justice requires.®^ Yet, courts and com-
vindicated without annulment of the security interest, under section 9(1) (a) of the UFCA, 
annulment (or more precisely subordination) is in fact "necessary to satisfy [the lien creditor's] 
claim." See supra note 45. 
U.C.C. § 2-402(3) provides; 
Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the 
seller 
(b) where . . . delivery is made . . . under circumstances which under any rule 
of law of the state where the goods are situated would apart from this Article 
constitute the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference. 
Section 2-402(3)(a) makes clear that this section is not to be bootstrapped into Article 9. See also 
id. § 2-403(4) ("rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed" by Articles 
9, 6 and 7). 
For an excellent essay on the meaning of section 1-103, see Hillman, Construction of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. Indus. & 
Com. L. Rev. 655 (1976). Professor Hillman's basic theme is that seetion 1-103 should not be an 
excuse to use the old common law to override inconsistent UCC policies explieitly or implicitly 
set forth in statutory language. Unfortunately, he does not address the extent to which section 9-
201 eliminates the utility of section 1-103. Nevertheless, he recognizes that statutory language in 
the UCC may imperfectly express the true intent of the drafters and that it may be necessary for 
courts to assert old common law rules over express UCC language. This should occur, writes 
Professor Hillman, "if, but only if, the logic of the common law is clearly consistent with 
purposes and polieies of the Code, while the technical language of an express section is clearly 
inconsistent." Id. at 686. What will be said about lien creditors falls within Professor Hillman's 
methodology. 
For example. Professor Kripke notes: "It must not be forgotten that . . . principles of 
state law may in some situations be involved, such as . . . the law of fraudulent conveyance . . . 
and . . . general equitable principles . . . ." N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-301 practice commentary at 429-
30 (McKinney 1964). Professors Baird and Jackson agree, stating that "despite 9-201's bold 
assertion that only other provisions of the [UCC] override it, obviously other statutory law . . . 
must be considered." D. Baird & T. Jackson, supra note 41, at 367-68. Instead, according to 
these authors, section 9-201 merely establishes a presumption that may be rebutted by common 
law rules. Id. at 368. Finally, Professor Gilmore comments: "If the Code had described itself as 
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mentators alike have made a fair amount of fuss over section 9-201. 
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, quoting 
White and Summers, has said: "This section has been called the 
'golden rule of Article Nine' . . . and is fundamental to the treatment 
of security interests under the Code."®® Because section 9-201 is taken 
seriously from time to time, it is necessary to discuss a difficulty that 
threatens the priorities accorded by section 9-301 to senior lien credi­
tors. 
Priorities between judicial liens and security interests mean pre­
cious little if they do not culminate in money proceeds from a sale that 
can be distributed to the claimants according to their priority. Of 
course, in order to have proceeds to distribute, something of value 
must be offered to attract a buyer. If the selling agent who enforces a 
lien cannot offer good title to the personal property involved, he can 
hardly expect a buyer to supply the proceeds necessary to effectuate a 
lien priority system. 
Foreclosure is the method by which the sheriff, receiver or repos­
sessing secured party offers good title to the property that is for sale. 
Surprisingly, even though foreclosure is at the absolute center of any 
lien enforcement procedure, the subject has suffered from legislative 
carelessness and scholarly neglect.®^ 
Because there is a dearth of literature on the subject, some basic 
principles of lien foreclosure will be deduced. These principles will 
then be compared to the UCC provisions that apply when a security 
interest is being enforced. As will be shown, because these two fore­
closure systems fail to mesh, the lien priorities of section 9-301 could 
be effectively reversed. As a result, administrative control of the sale is 
a vital issue between a lien creditor and a secured party. 
A. Foreclosure of Judicial Liens 
State lien law is often silent on the extent of the interests fore­
closed. As a matter of logic, however, the minimal title the sheriff 
the exclusive source of law, we may doubt that the description would have been taken seriously, 
even for literary purposes. But it does not." Gilmore, supra note 27, at 472 (making no mention 
of 9-201). 
Allegaert v. Chemical Bank, 657 F.2d 495, 508 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting J. White and R. 
Summers, supra note 13, § 25-12, at 938); cf. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under 
Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 906, 919-23, 936-45 (1978) 
(examples of general equitable principles under Article 9 and the "displacement proviso" of 
section 1-103). In spite of the "golden rule" of section 9-201, Professor Summers seems to favor 
liberal use of equitable doctrines. See id. at 931, 936, 942. Unfortunately, his article does not 
explicitly comment upon the relationship between section 9-201 and section 1-103. 
" For the origin and history of foreclosure, see 2 C. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 43.2, at 1184-
90; 1 C. Glenn, Mortgages §§ 57-58.1 (1943). 
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must offer for the sheriff's sale to work is title good against both the 
creditor whose lien is being enforced and the judgment debtor. If a 
lien creditor were able to relevy goods from the buyer at a sheriffs sale 
to satisfy the remainder of the judgment, no buyer would bid and 
liens would never be satisfied by sheriffs sale proceeds. Similarly, if 
the debtor could simply take back the property after the sale, the 
buyer's title would be worthless. At least these two interests must be 
"foreclosed" by the sheriff's sale. 
In exchange for the foreclosure of their property interests, the 
judgment creditor and the judgment debtor are given rights to receive 
proceeds from the sale, according to their "priority." In a well de­
signed lien system, foreclosure of an interest and the right to share in 
sale proceeds should be coterminous principles.®® As shall be seen, 
however, the UCC itself does not conform to this minimal standard. 
This failure to coordinate foreclosure with the right to receive pro­
ceeds is one source of the difficulties to which we shall soon turn.®® 
Foreclosure of outstanding property rights is what the purchaser 
at a sheriffs sale pays for.®'^ It follows that when state law increases 
the number of property interests that are foreclosed, the price the 
buyer is willing to pay will rise.®® For this reason, state legislatures, 
when they have thought about it, have provided for the foreclosure of 
many more interests than merely those of the enforcing judgment 
creditor and the judgment debtor. The typical foreclosure statute 
provides that when the sheriff issues a deed to the purchaser of per­
sonal property at a judicial sale, he conveys whatever rights the 
judgment debtor had at the time the judicial lien first arose.®® Such a 
statute should successfully foreclose all interests created by the debtor 
Cf. In re Riverside Inv. Partnership, 674 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Generally, in a 
'free and clear' sale, the liens are impressed on the proceeds of the sale and discharged at the time 
of sale; in a 'subject to' sale, on the other hand, the lien survives the sale in some form for some 
period of time, however slight."); 26 U.S.C. § 7425(a) (1982) (if a United States tax lien is 
foreclosed, the government gets a share of the proceeds according to its priority); 4B Collier On 
Bankruptcy 170.99[3] (L. King 14th ed. 1978) (in a judicial sale, the property can be transferred 
free of liens, so long as the lienholder has the opportunity to satisfy his right to the proceeds). 
See infra text accompanying notes 126-44. 
" See Moorehead v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 194 Colo. 398, 402, 572 P.2d 1207, 
1210 (1977). 
See Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1972) 
("Chattels sold at an execution sale should be sold free and clear of all encumbrances in order to 
ensure the highest price and to stimulate bidding."). 
™ E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1625 (1982) (certificate of sale conveys "all the right 
which the debtor had in the property on the day the levy was made"); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 30-435 
(1979) (buyer at sberiffs sale gets "all the right, title and interest which the debtor had in and to 
the property sold, on the day the execution was delivered"); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 
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after the attachment of the lien being enforced. Admittedly, these 
statutes do not explicitly provide for the foreclosure of subsequently 
created property interests, but as a matter of logic and policy such 
foreclosures must occur. If the debtor attempts to transfer the encum­
bered property to a third party who is not entitled to protection of the 
type these statutes sometimes give to good faith purchasers,^" the 
transferee can be in no better position than the debtor himself. Since 
all the transferee can obtain is the debtor's interest in the property, 
and since the debtor's interest must be foreclosed for the sale to be 
successful, the transferee's interest must be foreclosed as well.^' A 
similar argument can be made for the foreclosure of involuntary 
transfers (i.e., junior judicial liens) that are created after the lien 
being enforced first arises. 
Some states have developed a more complex concept of foreclo­
sure, providing that senior judicial liens, as well as subsequently 
11-501 (Supp. 1983) (sheriff seizes all the defendant's rights when he levies); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 
21.170, .180 (1981) (sheriff conveys what debtor had on the day of levy); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A;26-15 (West 1952) (when sheriff sells property pursuant to an attachment lien, the deed 
conveys "all the title to such property had by a defendant ... at the time that the writ of 
attachment became a lien thereon"). Curiously, New Jersey's foreclosure statute is not applicable 
when the sheriff enforces an execution lien. See id. 
™ In many states, a bona fide purchaser can take property free of a judicial lien that was 
prior to the actual levy by the sheriff. In New York, for instance, a lien arises when the execution 
is delivered to the sheriff. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5202(a) (McKinney 1978). However, until the 
sheriff levies the encumbered property, any transferee for value takes the property as if it were 
unencumbered. Id. § 5202(a)(1). Bona fide purchaser protection in lien statutes is discussed in 
Carlson & Shupack, supra note 21, at 299-315. 
" If this were not true, then debtors could defeat sheriffs sales (and the entire debt 
enforcement mechanism) by eleventh hour conveyances to third parties. See infra text accompa­
nying notes 112-22. 
A few states provide that the sheriffs deed conveys what the debtor could have conveyed, 
but they neglect to state the time at which the conveyance is deemed made. E.g., B.C. Code 
Ann. § 15-39-830 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Because of the danger that eleventh hour conveyances 
pose to sheriffs' sales, the proper construction of such statutes is that the sheriff conveys the 
debtor's interest at the time the lien first arose. See Kollock v. Jackson, 5 Ga. 153 (1848). 
The nation's least fortunate statute is in Hawaii and states that "[n]o sale by execution shall 
operate to convey a greater estate or interest in the property sold [than] the defendant in 
execution had at the time of sale." Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 651-49 (1976). Such a statute implies that 
the debtor has the power to convey property at any time after the execution lien arises but before 
the sale. In one case, the Hawaii Supreme Court was able to protect the integrity of a sheriff s 
sale of real estate from an eleventh hour mortgage, by virtue of a statute, id. § 634-29 ("All after-
leases, mortgages, sales, devises, assignments, trusts, or other conveyances of the property, until 
the dissolution of the process, shall be void in law as against the plaintiff in such cases."). In re 
Trustees of Robinson, 51 Hawaii 164, 454 P.2d 116 (1969). But this statute applies only to 
prejudgment attachments, not postjudgment executions, and only to real estate, not personal 
property. Fortunately for the buyer at the execution sale in Robinson, the lien being enforced 
was a prejudgment attachment lien on real estate. In other cases, however, no readily apparent 
solution exists to prevent destruction of the sheriff s sale by creation of eleventh hour conveyances 
to good faith purchasers. 
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created interests, are foreclosed by a sheriff's sale.''^ Obviously, such a 
provision increases the efficiency of debt enforcement procedures by 
increasing the price that each sale of personal property will produce. 
These states, by foreclosing senior judicial liens, reward the diligence 
of the junior lien creditor in having been the first to enforce a lien.'^' 
A large number of state legislatures, however, have never consid­
ered the question of foreclosure of competing property interests. Some 
states simply direct the sheriff to sell the encumbered property, with­
out indicating the scope of the property interest to be conveyed to the 
purchaser.'^ In such states, courts are left to their own devices in 
determining the extent to which interests are foreclosed by a sheriff's 
sale. Fortunately, because the foreclosure question appears more im­
portant with regard to real estate, detailed foreclosure provisions 
pertaining only to real estate often do exist.Taking advantage of 
this, one court used an analogy to real estate foreclosure provisions 
pertaining to a state tax lien where the legislature had failed to speak 
on foreclosure by sale of personal property.'® Analogies to real estate 
foreclosure provisions can provide adequate guidance to the courts of 
Florida has accomplished this by case law. See Love v. Williams, 4 Fla, 126 (1851). A 
more recent case has apparently modified Love by holding that only purchasers with no 
knowledge of senior liens can take free of such liens. Flagship State Bank v. Carantzas, 352 So. 
2d 1259, 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Other language in Flagship suggests that when the bad 
faith purchaser later sold the still encumbered property to a second transferee who was a good 
faith purchaser, that second purchaser took the property free of the judicial lien. See id. at 1263. 
Other states have provisions that foreclose senior judicial liens in real estate. E.g., N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A;17-39 (West 1952); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5236(b) (McKinney 1978); W. Va. Code § 
38-3-13 (1966). But see Va. Code § 8.01-480 (1977) (senior judicial liens not foreclosed). Through 
oversight or perhaps design, these states have not made similar provisions with regard to personal 
property sales. 
The federal tax lien statute authorizing the sale of the debtor's property is silent on the 
extent of foreclosure. See 26 U.S.C. § 7403 (1982). The Supreme Court, however, has recently 
ruled that where the debtor's property is held in cotenancy, the interests of all cotenants should 
be foreclosed, with the foreclosed parties taking a share of the proceeds. See United States v. 
Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. 2132, 2141-46 (1983). Rodgers amounts to a rule foreclosing senior property 
interests. 
E.g., Code of Civil Procedure, 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 12-158 (Smith-Hurd 1983) ("All 
goods and chattels, real and personal, may be taken and sold to satisfy a judgment, except as 
otherwise provided by law."). 
See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 4454 (1964) (title to realty relates back to date of 
its seizure); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.6061 (West 1968) (sheriff conveys debtor's real estate 
interest as of the time of levy); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 766 (West 1960) (sheriff conveys 
debtor's real estate interest at the time the judgment is docketed.); see also In re Mills, 32 Bankr. 
507 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (title to realty deemed given at time lien attached); Mahalko v. Arctic 
Trading Co., 29 Wash. App. 411, 628 P.2d 859 (1981) (title to real estate reflected by sheriffs 
deed relates back to entry of judgment). 
" Moorehead v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 194 Colo. 398, 572 P.2d 1207 (1977). 
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most states when questions arise concerning the nature of a pur­
chaser's title to personalty bought at a sheriff s sale. 
The basic foreclosure statute described above also implies that if 
transfers subsequent to the judicial lien being enforced are foreclosed 
because the debtor can only transfer rights that, logically speaking, 
are subject to foreclosure, then, conversely, transfers prior in time to 
the judicial lien are never foreclosed. Even the states that foreclose 
senior judicial liens do not foreclose other senior interests.'''' Therefore, 
under the typical foreclosure provision, voluntary transfers made 
prior to attachment of the judicial lien cannot be foreclosed by a deed 
to the purchaser at a sheriff's sale.''® Such a deed conveys only the 
interest that the debtor had at the time the judicial lien first arose, and 
by that time, antecedent transfers had already reduced the debtor's 
equity in the encumbered property. This does not mean, however, 
that the sheriff will be uninterested in property conveyed away prior 
to attachment of the judicial lien. Where the debtor has retained some 
equity in the property, it could be levied upon by the sheriff.''® For 
" See Sisco v. New Jersey Bank, 151 N.J. Super. 363, 376 A.2d 1287 (Law Div. 1977), rev'd 
on other grounds, 158 N.J. Super. Ill, 385 A.2d 890 (App. Div. 1978). 
" See Justice, Secured Parties and Judgment Creditors—The Courts and Section 9-311 of 
The Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Bus. Law. 433, 434 (1975). The federal government cannot 
be foreclosed when it is a senior tax lien creditor. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1982) ("A sale to 
satisfy a lien inferior to one of the United States shall be made subject to and without disturbing 
the lien of the United States, unless the United States consents that the property may be sold free 
of its lien and the proceeds divided as the parties may be entitled."). Section 2410 apparently 
applies only to sales ordered by a judge. Execution sales are not considered "judicial sales," A.H. 
& R.S. Coal Corp. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 752, 755 (W.D. Pa. 1978), and so are governed 
by section 7425, 26 U.S.C. § 7425(b) (1982). Even with regard to "nonjudicial sales," the 
government may not be foreclosed when it has a senior lien (although this conclusion requires a 
boost from 26 C.F.R. § 301.7425-2(3) (1983)). The government's ability to keep its senior liens 
out of the fray of an execution sale was upheld in Berlin v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 298 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
™ See U.C.C. § 9-311. Section 9-311, permitting such levies, repeals prior state laws that 
frequently prohibited the sheriff from levying the debtor's interest in property encumbered by 
security interests. See Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 253 Ark. 639, 640, 488 S.W.2d 14,15 
(1972). California and Massachusetts, however, have overriden section 9-311 with nonuniform 
legislation, thereby restricting levies of property encumbered by security interests. Cal. Civ. 
Proc. Code §§ 720.240(a)(4)(B), .270(a) (West Supp. 1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 223, § 74 
(West 1958); id. § 75 (West Supp. 1983-1984); id. ch. 246, §§ 60-61 (West 1959); see Coogan, 
The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1399 n.lOl (1968). Idaho has similar 
legislation, but only with regard to prejudgment attachment. Idaho Code § 8-506A (1979); see 
Henderson, The Judicial Creditor Versus the Article Nine Secured Party, 17 Idaho L. Rev. 193, 
210-13 (1981). These statutes are occasionally supplemented by provisions allowing the judg­
ment creditor the option of paying money to the senior secured party and proceeding with the 
levy from which both the judicial lien and the subrogated senior security interest will be 
satisfied. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 720.290 (West Supp. 1983); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, 
§§ 4251-4256 (1980). These vestiges of pre-UCC law may reflect common law concepts of real 
estate mortgages wherein the secured lender appeared as holder of title to the land. Apparently, 
570 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:547 
example, if a pieee of equipment worth $10,000 is subject to a per­
fected security interest of $5,000, or if an undivided half interest in the 
equipment has been sold to a buyer, the sheriff will still levy upon the 
machine on behalf of an execution creditor and will then sell the 
judgment debtor's $5,000 interest in the equipment. Of course, the 
earlier transferee's interest is not foreclosed, and whoever buys the 
equipment takes subject to the unforeclosed interest.®" 
The question of foreclosure is greatly complicated by the presence 
of a recording statute that subordinates an earlier unrecorded transfer 
to a later one. Real estate recording statutes, for example, protect 
subsequent bona fide purchasers from such prior secret conveyances. 
A "purchase," however, connotes a voluntary transfer from the 
debtor.®^ A judicial lien, on the other hand, is an involuntary transfer 
from the debtor and is not within the bounds of a bona fide pur­
chase.®^ Therefore, when a recording statute protects only bona fide 
purchasers, judicial lien creditors continue to have status that is "jun­
ior" to prior unrecorded conveyances. Nevertheless, judicial lien cred­
itors enjoy important indirect benefits from bona fide purchaser pro­
tection. Protected bona fide purchasers who take free of prior secret 
conveyances of real estate will pay more at the sheriff s sale than will 
unprotected purchasers who must take subject to such conveyances.®® 
The excess proceeds generated by the protection of bona fide pur­
chasers go directly to the judicial lien creditor for whom the sale is 
held. 
Some states extend protection of the recording statutes to credi­
tors, usually by stating that bona fide purchasers and creditors take 
free from secret conveyances.®^ The scope and nature of this extended 
protection are rarely spelled out, but when the words "and creditors" 
are added to the recording statute, a court can feel free to change the 
rules of the sheriffs sale in such a way that creditors are indeed 
the common law could not conceive of a levy upon land where the records did not reveal the 
debtor to be owner. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 38.5, at 1017-19; Ward, Ordering the 
Judicial Process Lien and the Security Interest under Article Nine: Meshing Two Different 
Worlds—Secured Parties and Post-Judgment Process Greditors (pt. 1), 31 Me. L. Rev. 223, 227 
(1980). 
Gf. Berlin v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (antecedent perfected tax 
lien survived real estate sale under New York lien law). 
See U.G.G. § 1-201(32). 
See 4 American Law of Property § 17.10, at 562-63 (A. Casner ed. 1952) (the term 
purchaser does not include judgment creditors). 
See Justice, supra note 78, at 434. 
" See 4 American Law of Property, supra note 82, § 17.29, at 609 & n.l. 
1984] DEATH AND SUBORDINATION 571 
protected. The patterns of creditor protection vary greatly.®® Some 
rules protect only lien creditors where the lien arose before the secret 
conveyance was recorded. Others protect nonlien creditors who had 
no knowledge of the secret conveyance when credit was first ex­
tended. Among the rules that protect only lien creditors, some require 
that the lien creditor be without knowledge at the time the lien 
arose,®® while others make no bona fide requirements upon the lien 
creditor.®'' The choice of protection is often mandated by a linguistic 
quirk of the recording statute, although occasionally the statute is 
vague enough to allow the courts to choose the best rule as a matter of 
policy. 
In all cases, pnce the creditor qualifies for protection, the state of 
knowledge of the buyer at a sheriffs sale is irrelevant. Under record­
ing statutes that grant status to creditors against prior secret convey­
ances, even bad faith purchasers take the real estate free of secret 
encumbrances. ®® 
Article 9, of course, is the recording statute that applies to trans­
fers of security interests in personal property. What Article 9 means 
for the sheriff s sale is a matter to be explained after a brief discussion 
concerning the enforcement of UCC security interests. 
B. The Secured Party's Right to Enforce His Interest 
After Default 
Enforcement of a security interest differs greatly from enforce­
ment of a judicial lien. First, enforcement of a judicial lien is an 
immediate right, limited only by the minimum time during which a 
sheriffs sale must be advertised.®® A secured party, on the other hand, 
must wait until default has occurred to exercise his rights, which are 
carefully circumscribed in part 5 of Article 9.®° 
See id. at 609-10, 610 n.2; Note, Rights of Creditors of the Mortgagor Against the Holder 
of an Unrecorded Mortgage, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 539 (1913); Note, Execution Sales—Rights of 
Bona Fide Purchasers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 805, 806-07, 813 (1940). 
Cf. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1962) (protecting lien creditors without knowledge). 
" Cf. id. (1972) (protecting lien creditors in spite of knowledge). 
4 American Law of Property, supra note 82, § 17.30, at 612 ("if the judgment creditor 
himself was protected by the statute against unrecorded transactions, the purchaser at the sale 
obtains a good title irrespective of notice" (footnotes omitted)). 
Of course, the rules pertaining to prejudgment liens are different. Pending judgment, the 
sheriff usually holds the encumbered property or, if the goods are perishable and must be sold 
immediately, holds the cash proceeds from the sale. E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6218(a) 
(McKinney 1980). 
^ U.C.C. § 9-501(1). 
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1. Sale by the Secured Party 
Enforcement of the security interest is not necessarily limited to 
sale, although sale is certainly the centerpiece of the UCC's enforce­
ment procedure. Under certain circumstances, the secured party may 
simply retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, hut only if the 
debtor and junior secured parties do not object.®' In either case, the 
secured party must gain control of the collateral. The UCC permits 
simple self-help, provided there is no breach of the peace.®^ Alterna­
tively, the secured party may replevy the collateral through the usual 
judicial means.®® 
Unlike the sheriff, the secured party choosing to conduct the sale 
himself need not auction the property if he can substitute some other 
commercially reasonable method of sale.®'* In this regard the secured 
party resembles a receiver appointed in a supplemental proceeding.®® 
The right to conduct the sale is of immense importance to the secured 
party, in large part because the sheriff is viewed as a rather ham-
handed and unproductive selling agent.®® Thus, in the extensive litiga­
tion between secured parties and judicial lien creditors, secured par­
ties have strongly asserted their right to control the sale in order to 
maximize the sales price and, hence, their return on the defaulted 
loan.®'' 
The secured party also resembles a receiver and a sheriff in that 
he may award himself the administrative expenses connected with the 
sale before applying the balance of the proceeds to reduce his debt.®® 
If the debt is not fully satisfied by the proceeds of the sale, the deficit 
remains as an unsecured claim against the debtor.®® 
" See id. § 9-505(2). 
Id. § 9-503. 
" Id. 
" Id. § 9-504(3). 
»» See Udel v. Udel, 82 Misc. 2d 882, 370 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Civ. Ct. 1975). 
" See Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 518, 392 N.E.2d 1240, 1242, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 56, 59 (1979) ("Any judicial sale ... is a tragic event."). Professor Gilmore wonders 
whether a sale hy the secured party is any better. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 43.2, at 1188 
("The surplus to he returned to the debtor after the sale is a glittering mirage; the deficiency 
judgment is the grim reality."). 
»' See Henderson, supra note 79, at 207-08. See generally Justice, supra note 78, at 438-41 
(discussing various cases involving the secured party's right to possession). 
U.G.G. § 9-504(l)(a). 
™ Id. § 9-504(2); cf. 11 U.S.G. § 506(a) (1982) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by 
a lien on property in which the estate has an interest... is an unsecured claim to the extent that 
the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim."). 
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Like the sheriff and receiver, the secured party conducting the 
sale must distribute the proceeds of the sale according to priorities. 
The UCC provides for junior secured parties to make a demand for a 
share of the proceeds. In exchange, their junior security interests in 
the property are foreclosed by the sale.'o^ Secured parties who are 
senior to the seller, however, are not entitled to share in the proceeds 
at all,^"^ because their security interests are not foreclosed. Accord­
ingly, the buyer of the collateral at a UCC sale takes the property 
subject to any senior security interests. Naturally, the price that a 
buyer is willing to pay largely depends on the number of liens and 
interests still outstanding and the risk that unknown surviving encum­
brances will come to light in the future. 
Relevant here is the fact that not only are junior security interests 
foreclosed by the UCC sale, but junior judicial liens are foreclosed as 
well.'"® Senior judicial liens, however, are not foreclosed. A discussion 
of the significance of the foreclosure of junior judicial liens will be 
deferred momentarily in order to describe how a secured party can 
enforce his interest by use of judicial process. 
2. Use of Judicial Process 
The self-help method of enforcing a security interest after default 
is permitted only where the debtor acquiesces. If self-help is not 
available without a breach of the peace, the secured party must resort 
to judicial process.'®® Judicial process requires that the secured party 
reduce his claim to judgment. The judgment may be for replevin, if 
the secured party wishes to conduct the sale, or it may simply be a 
money judgment, in which case the secured party, as a judgment 
creditor, enforces the judgment by obtaining an execution or follow­
ing an alternative enforcement procedure.'®'' 
Although the sheriffs sale on behalf of a judgment creditor hold­
ing a security interest must be conducted pursuant to the provisions of 
U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(c). 
"» Id. § 9-504(4). 
These senior interests are not listed in sections 9-504(1) (a) to (c) as among those entitled 
to share in the proceeds. 
U.C.C. § 9-504(4); see also id. § 9-306(2) ("security interest continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale"). 
On the effect that risk of secret liens has on price, see Carlson & Shupack, supra note 21, 
at 306-09. 
'<« U.C.C. § 9-504(4). 
See supra text accompanying notes 91-92. 
See U.C.C. § 9-501(1). 
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state lien law, the UCC changes the significance of the sheriffs actions 
in two principal ways—the first involves the priorities by which the 
money proceeds are distributed, and the second involves the number 
of interests foreclosed by the sale.'°® 
As to the effect of Article 9 on the priorities the sheriff must honor 
when enforcing a secured party's money judgment, section 9-501(5) 
provides: 
When a secured party has redueed his claim to judgment the 
lien of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of 
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate baek to the 
date of the perfection of the seeurity interest in such collateral. 
Thus, a secured party with a money judgment is entitled to Article 9 
priorities when the sheriff levies collateral. If this were not the case, 
the secured party would be forced to rely on the priority of his judicial 
lien, which could be considerably lower.'"® 
As to the number of interests foreclosed, according to section 9-
504(4), a sale of collateral by the sheriff on behalf of the secured party 
forecloses not only the security interest of the enforcing party and the 
property interest of the debtor—the logically minimum foreclosures— 
but also all security interests and judicial liens junior to the enforcing 
security interest. The foreclosure provisions of the UCC, however, 
must be added to the independent foreclosure provisions under state 
lien law. When, for example, a Florida sheriff is selling collateral on 
behalf of a UCC secured party, the number of interests foreclosed 
increases to the maximum extent available under the combined bodies 
of law. While junior interests are foreclosed under the UCC, senior 
judicial liens are foreclosed under Florida case law."" In Florida, 
therefore, no execution or attachment lien can survive a UCC sheriff s 
sale. The only surviving encumbrances are security interests that are 
senior to all security interests participating in the distribution of pro­
ceeds from the sheriff's sale. 
"•8 See id. §§ 9-301(l)(b), (2), (4), -501(5). 
'"8 See infra note 113. Section 9-501(5) is subject to a drafting peculiarity. It states that the 
priority of the secured party's judicial lien relates back only to perfection of the security interest, 
not to the time of filing. Therefore, in after-acquired property or future advance cases, interven­
ing security interests might take priority under section 9-501(5), whereas they would be junior 
under section 9-312(5)(a), which gives priority to the first secured party to perfect or file. See D. 
Baird & T. Jackson, supra note 41, at 805 (further explicated in the accompanying Teacher's 
Manual at 145); see also Carlson & Shupack, supra note 21, at 343-46 (discussing the "first to 
perfect or file" rule in the context of judicial liens). 
See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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C. Two Problems in Administering the Sale of Encumbered 
Property 
There are two problems that have not been adequately appreci­
ated in the literature. The first concerns whether judicial lien credi­
tors can foreclose the interests of secured parties. If not, a secured 
party may be able to skew the results of priorities under section 9-301 
simply by ignoring the judicial sale instigated by a lien creditor. The 
second problem concerns the absence of rights of judicial lien creditors 
in UCC sales conducted by the secured parties, even though junior 
liens are foreclosed. 
1. Can Nonuniform Lien Law Destroy Security Interests 
Without Authority from a UCC Provision? 
Section 9-306(2) reinforces the presumption in section 9-201"^ 
that security interests are always good against creditors of the 
debtor unless a specific provision of the UCC says otherwise. 
According to section 9-306(2), "a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition 
thereof." This, again, is subject to other contrary provisions of 
Article 9. If nothing in the UCC provides for the foreclosure of 
junior security interests when senior judicial liens are foreclosed, 
then sections 9-201 and 9-306(2) require that such security inter­
ests be unforeclosable. But this reasoning leads to absurd results. 
For example, where a judicial lien has attached and a sheriff's sale 
of levied property is imminent, a debtor may create a security 
interest in the eleventh hour before the sale. Under state lien law, 
the subsequent transfer would be foreclosed upon sale, but UCC 
section 9-201 states that only a UCC provision can foreclose the 
junior interest. If no such UCC provision exists, the junior security 
interest will survive the sale and will be enforceable against the 
buyer. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania"^ and a court in 
See supra text accompanying notes 58-63. 
Bloom V. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 (1967), discussed in 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1421 
(1969). The facts of this case are quite complicated. X had a senior perfected security interest in 
some pipe. Z had an unperfected and hence junior security interest in the same pipe. A judgment 
creditor (Y) caused the pipe to be levied upon, thereby creating a lien that was junior to X's 
security interest but senior to Z's security interest. At the sheriff's sale, X purchased the pipe. Z 
thereafter sought to replevy the pipe on the grounds that his security interest survived the sheriffs 
sale. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied replevin to Z, holding that X had a senior security 
interest in the pipe that Z could not disturb. Significantly, the court also found that Z's security 
interest survived the foreclosure sale because X was a buyer with knowledge and therefore 
unprotected by section 9-301 (l)(c). The court simply assumed that Y's execution sale would not 
foreclose a junior security interest. 
The case can also be criticized for allowing X, the senior secured party and owner of the 
equity (in between whieh fell the security interest of Z), to fend off Z when X was not presently 
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K e n t u c k y ^ h a v e  a c t u a l l y  r e a c h e d  t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n ,  a n d  n o  c o u r t  
has clearly articulated any reasons for a different rule."'' 
intending to sell. Even a junior secured party has a right to enforce his interest by repossession 
and sale pursuant to part 5 of Article 9. Roemer & Zeller, Inc. v. Ace Transmission Center, Inc., 
114 Misc. 2d 415, 416, 454 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1982), vacating 114 Misc. 2d 310, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Nickles, Rights and Remedies Between U.C.C. Article 9 Secured 
Parties with Conflicting Security Interests in Goods, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 217, 218-31 (1983). 
Although X's right to conduct the sale might be superior to Z's right to do the same, X should not 
have been able to play "dog in the manger" at the expense of Z. For a discussion of competition 
for the right to administer the sale, see infra text accompanying notes 126-44. 
Tabers v. Jackson Purchase Prod. Credit Ass'n, 649 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). 
This opinion is seriously flawed in numerous ways. In Tabers, a judgment creditor had initiated 
a sheriffs sale. An unperfected secured party (whose financing statement had lapsed) appeared 
at the sale to announce his interest. The court held that the buyer at the sale took subject to the 
unperfected security interest. 
One feature of this case is that the judgment creditor was also a secured party. The court 
should have found that section 9-504(4) foreclosed the junior security interest, but the court 
assumed that the senior secured party had elected to sue on the judicial lien only and therefore 
had no status under the UCC. Accord In re Wilson, 390 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Kan. 1975) (reliance 
on judicial lien precludes later reliance on security interest as a matter of res judicata). One 
would have thought that the "relation back" aspect of section 9-501(5) was automatic. See Hilar, 
Inc. v. Sherman, 40 Colo. App. 38, 41, 572 P.2d 489, 491-92 (1977) ("a secured creditor need 
not 'elect' his choice of remedies"). Nevertheless, the judgment creditor was treated as if it were a 
lien creditor without Article 9 rights. 
If the court's assumption that the judgment creditor had waived its Article 9 rights is 
accepted at face value, the lapsed security interest is indeed junior to the judicial lien held by the 
judgment creditor. Section 9-403(2) states; "If the security interest becomes unperfected upon 
lapse, it is deemed to have been unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser or lien 
creditor before lapse." The meaning of the court's opinion, then, must be that senior judicial 
liens may not foreclose junior security interests. 
Another court also was persuaded that nothing in the UCC forecloses junior security 
interests, so that when a buyer at the enforcement sale has knowledge, he takes subject to the 
unperfected security interest. This court, however, was reversed. In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., 
Inc., 280 F. Supp. 433 (F.D. Pa. 1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1969). In this case, the issue 
was whether a bankruptcy trustee (who is given the status of lien creditor under UCC section 9-
301(3)) could sell property free of an unperfected security interest. The lower court reasoned that 
since the buyer from the trustee had knowledge of the unperfected security interest, neither 
section 9-301(l)(c) nor any other UCC provision affected the security interest. In reversing this 
holding, the court of appeals claimed that it was not deciding the issue of whether security 
interests may be foreclosed by nonuniform lien law. Instead, the court ruled that the federal 
strong-arm provision. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(c), 30 Stat. 544, 566 (repealed 1978 
for bankruptcies filed after October 1, 1979), allowed a trustee to sell property free of liens 419 
F.2d at 359. 
In fact, section 70(c) merely grants lien creditor status to the trustee and depends entirely 
upon state law for its interpretation. The court erred in assuming that a junior security interest 
could ever be "invalid" as against the trustee under section 70(c) where state law did not 
similarly invalidate the unperfected security interest against judicial liens. Thus, when the court 
of appeals overruled the district court on whether the security interest survived the trustee's sale, 
it did indeed reach the issue of whether Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 (1967), was 
good law. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1982) (independent authority for the foreclosure of liens 
without the aid of state law). 
Only four cases have been found in which junior security interests were foreclosed (or 
thought to be foreclosed) by nonuniform lien law. In none of these did the court attempt to 
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Survival of the junior security interest effectively reverses the 
priority that section 9-301 (I)(b) gives to the lien creditor. A numerical 
confront section 9-201 of the UCC. In the case of In re Dean Monagin, Inc., 18 Mich. App. 171, 
170 N.W.2d 924 (1969), the court assumed that an assignee for the benefit of creditors (a lien 
ereditor under section 9-301(3)) could sell the debtor's property completely free of an unper-
feeted security interest sinee the assignee had become a lien ereditor within the meaning of 
section 9-30I(I)(b) before the security interest was perfected. In Columbia Int'l Corp. v. 
Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d 465 (1970), a receiver sold property held on consignment 
to a buyer with knowledge of the consignee's rights. The lower court held that the consignor's 
interest survived the receiver's sale because of the buyer's knowledge. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court disagreed, reasoning that a buyer's knowledge at a sherifFs sale is irrelevant if the 
judgment creditor's lien is senior to the consignor's Article 9 interest. Ultimately, this disposition 
seems correct, although the eourt did not bother to explain its result in light of section 9-201. 
Furthermore, the court's statement is mere dictum. The buyer who had knowledge in that 
case was the senior secured party for whom the receiver was acting. Under section 9-501(5), the 
judicial procedure used by a foreclosing secured party is vested with the effect of any other UCC 
sale. Under section 9-504(4), a buyer at a UCC sale "takes free" of all seeurity interests junior to 
the security interest being enforced. Therefore, the buyer's knowledge teas irrelevant in the 
Kempler case, hut because of section 9-504(4), not section 9-30I(I)(b). Section 9-504(4) clearly 
forecloses junior security interests, whereas section 9-30I(I)(b) does so only if one accepts the 
argument presented in this Article. 
A third case aetually ruled that senior seeurity interests should be foreclosed when junior 
judicial liens are foreclosed. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8 
(Del. 1972). In that case, a senior secured party petitioned the court to have an execution sale set 
aside on the theory that senior seeurity interests survive such sales. Indeed, they should survive, 
whieh is precisely why the sheriffs sale need not have been set aside. The judgment creditor 
(who seems also to have been the purchaser at the sale, as no other purchaser was made a party 
to the action) defended on the basis that the senior security interest was foreclosed by the sheriff's 
sale. Of course, if the sale were to be set aside, the question of foreclosure would become moot. 
Therefore, the defense was as nonsensical as the secured party's grounds for setting aside the sale. 
In any case, the sale was not set aside. The court held that under Delaware practice pertaining to 
sheriffs sales, all liens—even senior seeurity interests—are foreelosed, in exchange for which the 
foreclosed interests take a share of the proceeds according to priority. Id. at II-I2; cf. United 
States V. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983) (similar holding under tax lien statute). The Porter-
Way Harvester opinion is highly dubious law, but it proves that, at least in Delaware, nonuni­
form lien foreclosure law (here, judicially-created) can foreclose security interests in spite of 
section 9-201. Again, the court did not specifically consider the effect of section 9-201 on 
nonuniform law. 
Another case stating that nonuniform law can foreclose a junior security interest is Federal 
Sign & Signal Corp. v. Berry, 601 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (dictum). While 
ultimately the dictum seems correct, it was thoroughly misapplied in the case. In Berry, a 
landlord leased land to a tenant on the condition that, upon termination of the lease, any fixtures 
added by the tenant would become the landlord's property. Subsequently, a signmaker "leased" 
some signs to the tenant who affixed them to the land. As is so often the case, the signmaker 
found himself to be an unperfeeted secured party, rather than a lessor. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37). 
As such, his interest was junior to the landlord's ownership interest. See id. § 9-3I3(4)(a), (7). 
The secured party therefore had no right to repossess the signs. 
The Berry court, however, denied the right of the secured party to repossess the signs on the 
grounds that the junior security interest was destroyed when the landlord "sued to foreclose his 
landlord's lien." This analysis is demonstrahly wrong. Under Texas law, a landlord does indeed 
have a lien on his tenant's personal property to secure payment of rent, but in Berry the 
landlord's interest was not a statutory lien. Rather, it was a reversionary interest in real estate. 
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example will illustrate why this is so. Suppose the sheriff levies equip­
ment worth $10,000. Just prior to the sale the debtor creates a $4,000 
security interest, which the secured party advertises at the sheriff's 
sale. Buyers will pay no more than the encumbered value of the 
equipment; thus, the lien creditor will realize only $6,000 toward 
satisfaction of his judgment. If the junior secured party had been 
senior in the first place, the lien creditor would have realized the same 
$6,000 from the sheriffs sale. Therefore, inability to foreclose the 
junior security interest reverses the priorities and puts the senior lien 
creditor in the same position as if he had been junior. Such a result 
would turn the UCC into a statute analogous to those real estate 
recording provisions that protect bona fide purchasers, but not credi­
tors."® As stated earlier,"® the mere mention of creditor protection in 
a real estate recording statute has caused some courts to declare that 
unrecorded conveyances be foreclosed by judicial sale, making the 
knowledge of the buyer at the sale irrelevant. Ironically, section 9-201 
of the UCC poses at least the possibility that similar improvisation by 
the courts will not be possible with regard to personalty. 
As suggested earlier, section 1-103 could be used to assert nonuni­
form foreclosure rules over section 9-201, but this would seriously 
impair the general utility of section 9-201 to secured lenders. In 
addition, fraudulent conveyance law (also dependent upon section 1-
103 at the expense of section 9-201) could be used to destroy the junior 
security interest, but reliance on such law is an uncertain tool at 
best.'" Clearly, the existence of direct language in Article 9 would be 
created by a consensual and unconditional grant by the tenant. 601 S.W.2d at 138 (" 'all 
alterations and improvements made by the lessee shall become the lessor's property' "). The 
landlord was not enforcing a statutory lien but merely seeking a "judgment for . . . restitution of 
the premises" after termination of a lease. Tex. R. Civ. P. 748; see id. 751-755. Since the 
landlord was merely ejecting the tenant, no foreclosure of any interest occurred at all. Foreclo­
sure implies that the tenant's property was sold under court order, which did not occur here. 
New York has such a real estate recording statute. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291 (McKin-
ney 1968). In New York, mortgages can be created in anticipation of a judgment lien on land, 
and, if the mortgage is recorded before the sale, the mortgage will survive foreclosure. See 
Suffolk County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ii v. Geiger, 57 Misc. 2d 184, 291 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 
1968) (unperfected real estate mortgage has priority in foreclosure action where it was created 
before the judgment lien was docketed, although not recorded until after docketing). Lien 
creditors simply are not protected by such a recording statute. Id. at 186, 291 N.Y.S.2d. at 985 
("it is well settled that the protection of the recording act can be relied upon only by subsequent 
purchasers and mortgagees, not by judgment creditors" (emphasis in original)). 
See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. 
Cf. In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1976) (under the Bankruptcy Act's 
analogue to UFCA section 7, courts are reluctant to find actual fraud in cases where the 
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the best means for permitting the foreclosure of junior security inter­
ests. If such language can be found, the absurd reversal of priorities I 
have described can be avoided without eviscerating the favorable 
presumption for secured parties found in section 9-201. 
The question, then, is to what extent the UCC permits foreclo­
sure of a security interest. Three provisions that fit the "except" 
clauses in sections 9-201 and 9-306(2) are subsections (I)(b), (c) and 
(d) of section 9-301. According to these subsections, an unperfected 
security interest is subordinated to the rights of a "person who be­
comes a lien creditor" and to a buyer out of the ordinary course of 
business. Do these provisions allow for a conclusion that a lien foreclo­
sure provision can destroy a security interest?"® 
The protection given to buyers without knowledge is only of 
marginal utility. First, the protection in sections 9-301 (c) and (d) gives 
assistance where the buyer at the sheriffs sale has no knowledge of the 
unperfected security interest. But this "foreclosure" provision is easily 
evaded; the unperfected secured party can guarantee the survival of 
his security interest merely by advertising his interest at the sheriff's 
sale or by perfecting his interest prior to the sale. In either case, the 
buyer would have the fatal knowledge, whether actual or construc­
tive. 
The remaining possibility is section 9-301 (I)(b), which provides 
that "an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of 
... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest 
is perfected." As was true with regard to buyers without notice, the 
transferee gives fair consideration in exchange for a transfer); Note, supra note 59, at 502 
("emphasis on the transferee's state of mind contravenes . . . the limited function of fraudulent 
conveyance doctrine in the broader scheme of debtor-creditor law"). Apart from the difficult 
proof that the debtor had fraudulent intent, the avoiding creditor also must prove the secured 
party's bad faith. If the secured party is a bona fide purchaser, the transfer to him may not be set 
aside. UFCA § 9, 7A U.L.A. 304 (1978). 
Other UCC provisions that might foreclose security interests in other situations are not 
even remotely helpful in this context. For example, a buyer in the ordinary course of business 
"takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected 
and even though the buyer knows of its existence." U.C.C. § 9-307(1). A sheriff's sale, however, 
is clearly out of the ordinary course of business. See United States v. Newton Lake Estates, Inc., 
489 F. Supp. 432, 434 (M.D. Pa. 1979). Similarly, section 9-307(2) is a much narrower provi­
sion, applying only to unfiled security interests, where the seller and buyer are both consumers, 
and the buyer is without knowledge of the security interest. This section, of limited utility on its 
face, has been held inapplicable to sheriffs sales. National Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11, 
15, 223 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1967); see Carlson & Shupack, supra note 21, at 340-43. Section 9-
313(4)(d) applies only to security interests in fixtures. There, judicial liens on real estate are said 
to be merely subordinated to perfected security interests (and by negative implication are senior 
to unperfected interests), raising ambiguities similar to those in section 9-301 (l)(b). See infra text 
accompanying notes 121-22. 
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rights of an unperfected secured party are merely subordinated to the 
rights of a lien creditor. However, if it is true, as suggested, that 
subordination means death,"® then the rights of a buyer and a lien 
creditor are sufficiently similar to justify foreclosure upon enforce­
ment of the judicial lien. 
A buyer has the right to use and enjoyment of the property 
purchased—a right that is senior to the secured party's right to repos­
sess the collateral. A lien creditor has an analogous right—the right to 
cause the seizure and sale of encumbered property in satisfaction of 
judgment. As noted earlier, at a minimum, the sheriff can pass title 
free of the interests of the debtor and the enforcing lien creditor. State 
law usually provides for the foreclosure of additional junior interests. 
Without the ability to foreclose such junior interests, especially unper­
fected security interests, the "rights" of a lien creditor would often be 
worthless. In other words, the senior "rights" of a lien creditor must 
include the right to collect cash proceeds from a sheriff's sale before 
the junior secured party collects. Without foreclosure of the junior 
security interest, this right usually will be economically meaningless— 
seniority of the judicial lien would otherwise be the cash equivalent of 
juniority of the lien."® Therefore, the senior lien creditor should be 
able to achieve foreclosure of the secured party's junior interest if, 
under a state's nonuniform lien law, that interest would be otherwise 
foreclosed. 
Establishing a justification in the language of the UCC for a 
renvoi to nonuniform lien law avoids conflict with sections 9-201 and 
9-306(2), thereby preserving their efficacy for some worthier purpose. 
But it does not end the matter where the nonuniform law is insuffi­
cient to foreclose junior security interests. Some states merely provide 
that the sheriff conveys whatever property interest the debtor had at 
the time the execution lien arose."' Such provisions foreclose junior 
security interests created after the judicial lien arises, but they also 
leave prior unperfected security interests unscathed. These prior-but-
junior security interests can effectively work a reversal of UCC priori­
ties unless they are foreclosed. Fortunately, most states have no fore­
closure provision regarding personal property. Courts in these states 
See supra text accompanying notes 34-53. 
For numerical example of how seniority is the functional equivalent of juniority without 
foreclosure of junior interests, see text accompanying notes 114-16. 
See statutes cited supra note 69. 
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are free to adopt sensible rules for foreclosure of junior security inter­
ests.'^^ 
Even the states that have enacted specific foreclosure statutes for 
liens on personal property'^' need not be deterred from extending 
foreclosures to prior-but-junior security interests. States with real es­
tate recording statutes in which creditors are merely mentioned find 
no trouble in foreclosing prior unrecorded conveyances upon enforce­
ment of a subsequent judicial lien, even though such treatment is not 
provided for in the statutes.Under the UCC, lien creditors are 
treated no less vaguely than they are under these real estate recording 
statutes. By analogy to real estate law, courts should simply rule that 
all junior security interests are foreclosed. The restrictive foreclosure 
statutes may affirmatively require that subsequent transfers be fore­
closed, but they need not be read to imply that prior interests cannot 
be foreclosed. Significantly, when a UCC security interest is enforced, 
all junior seeurity interests and liens are foreclosed without regard to 
whether they are prior or subsequent in time to the senior security 
interest being enforced. The drafters of the UCC recognized the need 
for complete foreclosure of junior security interests, and so should the 
courts when interpreting (or creating) state lien law.'^® 
2. Control of the Sale Procedure 
A second administrative problem arises when the secured party 
conduets the sale of the encumbered property. In this situation, junior 
judicial liens are foreclosed,'^® but there is no requirement that the 
secured party notify the junior lien creditors of the foreclosure.'^'' 
The Supreme Court has done this with regard to the tax lien enforcement statutes, 
deciding that all competing interests are potentially foreclosable. United States v, Rodgers, 103 
S. Ct. 2132 (1983); see also supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the availability 
and use of real estate foreclosure statutes where such statutes do not exist for personalty). 
These are statutes that describe the sheriff's deed as conveying exactly what the debtor 
had when the lien arose. See statutes cited supra note 69. 
See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. 
Any foreclosure of recorded junior security interests must be consistent with the junior 
secured party's due process right to notification before his property interest is destroyed. See 
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983); First Nat'l Commerce & Fin. Co. 
V. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 360 So.2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The exact meaning of 
Mennonite as applied to commercial statutes is a serious issue that unfortunately cannot be taken 
up here. For a study of the effect of Mennonite on UCC foreclosure procedures, see Note, The 
Constitutionality of Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code; A Question of State 
Action and Procedural Due Process, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 497, 521-26 (1984). 
128 U.C.C. § 9-504(4). 
1" Under the 1972 UCC, notice of the sale of consumer goods only needs to be sent to the 
debtor (and even this is not necessary when the goods are "customarily sold in a recognized 
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Even where the junior lien ereditor somehow is notified of the sale, 
there is no provision requiring the selling party to give the junior lien 
creditor a share in the proceeds.'^® Similarly, the senior secured party 
and the senior lien creditor have no right to notice of or participation 
in the distribution, but at least these senior interests are not foreclosed 
by the UCC sale. The junior judicial lien creditor, however, faces 
foreclosure of his interest without any concomitant right to share in 
the proceeds of the sale. 
Fortunately, junior judicial lien creditors may have remedies 
available under nonuniform law that will preserve their property 
interests in the collateral. The senior secured party who has repos­
sessed collateral for sale is considered to be a third party holding 
property encumbered by judicial liens. State lien law usually provides 
that where a debtor's property is in the hands of a third party, it may 
be levied by the sheriff. The lien creditor therefore is able to obtain 
any surplus that exists after the UCC sale is concluded. 
market," are perishable or rapidly depreciating, or the debtor has waived his right to notice after 
default). See id. § 9-504(3) (1972). In all other cases, the repossessing secured party is required to 
inform only junior secured parties who have given written notice of their interests before the 
secured party sends notice to the debtor. See id. Under the 1962 UCC, the repossessing secured 
party had an affirmative duty to notify all junior secured parties of record. Id. § 9-504(3) (1962). 
For a discussion of the constitutional implications of section 9-504(3), see Note, supra note 125. 
See U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(c) (only junior secured parties are entitled to share in proceeds). 
Professor Gilraore found the exclusion of lien creditors from these provisions to be problematic. 
His rather simple suggestion is that courts hold their breath and rule that lien creditors be treated 
like secured parties for the purpose of receiving notice and sharing in proceeds. 2 G. Gilmore, 
supra note 8, § 44.8, at 1250. He also thought that lien creditors should be able to force a secured 
party to sell, rather than retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt or redeem prior to the 
sale. Id. § 44.2, at 1217-18; id. § 44.3, at 1225-26. In support of this view, it should be noted 
that judicial lien creditors manage to slip through UGC section 9-105(l)(m), which defines a 
secured party to be a "person in whose favor there is a security interest." Section 1-201(37) 
defines a security interest as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment 
or performance of an obligation." A judicial lien certainly qualifies as such an interest. Unfortu­
nately, the drafters of the UCC obviously used the term "lien" elsewhere in the UGC specifically 
to create a distinction between judicial lien creditors and secured parties. See U.G.G. §§ 9-
301(3), -504(4); Ward, supra note 79, at 227; see also U.G.G. § 9-102(2) ("[tjhis Article applies to 
security interests created by contract"); id. § 9-104(h) (Article 9 does not apply to "a right 
represented by a judgment"). 
See Preston Farms, Inc. v. Nacri, 42 A.D.2d 668, 345 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1973) (surplus after 
sheriffs sale of real estate could be reached by execution creditors); Metro Burak, Inc. v. 
Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 637, 372 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Gt. 1975) (levy of surplus 
in the hands of a secured party), modified on other grounds, 51 A.D.2d 1003, 380 N.Y.S.2d 758 
(1976). 
A somewhat unusual case is American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. O. & E., Inc., 40 
Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d 566 (1978). Here, a general creditor took control of the debtor's 
business (apparently with the debtor's consent). The creditor then brought an action styled as a 
"eomplaint in foreclosure" against the secured party. The creditor's intent was to pay off the 
senior secured party and retain the property, which had apparently been transferred to him in 
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However, levying proceeds is not a perfect solution. First, if the 
secured party obtains permission for strict foreclosure from the debtor 
and junior secured parties, there will be no cash proceeds.'^" Lien 
creditors have no standing to block strict foreclosures under section 9-
505."' Second, levying proceeds may be ineffective where the judicial 
lien creditor is "sandwiched" in priority between two secured parties. 
It is by no means clear that the lien creditor's second senior position as 
to the collateral would be preserved as to cash proceeds of the collat­
eral. Indeed, where a levy is required to establish a judicial lien,"^ 
there are very good reasons why cash should not be encumbered under 
a proceeds theory. A major impetus in establishing the levy as the 
moment when a lien arises is to prevent secret liens on property that 
the sheriff does not possess. A proceeds theory as to judicial liens 
would run afoul of such a policy. At the same time, renunciation of a 
proceeds theory for judicial liens inevitably promotes a junior secured 
party over the "sandwiched" lien creditor. This anomaly is created by 
the drafters' unfortunate exclusion of the lien creditor from distribu­
tion rights in section 9-504(4). 
Although junior lien creditors may be interested in having a 
judicial officer take charge of the sale (so that they can participate in 
the distribution of the proceeds), they should not be able to transfer 
control of the sale from the secured party to a sheriff or receiver. In 
William Iselin h- Co. v. Burgess h- Leigh, Ltd.,^^^ the court made a 
compelling point on this question. According to the court, when the 
sheriff levied property that was already encumbered by a security 
interest, he took the property subject to whatever contractual or 
statutory obligations the debtor owed to the secured party. The levied 
property was subject, therefore, to the secured party's right of repos­
session upon default. When default occurred, the sheriff, in deference 
satisfaction of an antecedent debt. The senior secured party insisted on conducting the sale itself, 
and the court agreed that this right existed. The court went further and ordered the secured 
party to pay any cash proceeds to the creditor. 
The best way to understand this vague case is that it is not a lien creditor case at all. Rather, 
the creditor was a purchaser of the assets. Accordingly, he was entitled to the cash proceeds as 
the debtor's successor without the need to obtain a lien or a levy of cash proceeds. Alternatively, 
if there was an undisclosed judicial lien, the parties were before the court anyway, so that the 
court order can be understood as an acknowledgement of an ad hoc garnishment of the cash by 
the lien creditor. 
See text accompanying notes 91 and 93. 
See Wechsler, Rights and Remedies of the Secured Party After an Unauthorized Transfer 
of Collateral; A Proposal for Balancing Competing Claims in Repossession, Resale, Proceeds, 
and Conversion Cases, 32 Buffalo L. Rev. 373, 388 (1983). 
E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.6012 (West 1968); see Carlson & Shupack, supra 
note 21, at 293-94. 
52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1967). 
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to the secured party's right, had to surrender the property to the 
secured party.Effectively, this decision grants to the senior secured 
party the right to control the sale.'^® 
The sine qua non of this right is default."® So long as default does 
not occur"'' (or, if default has occurred, so long as the secured party 
Id. at 824, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 662. The court relied upon a pre-UCC case, General Motors 
Aceeptance Corp. v. Maloney, 46 Misc. 2d 251, 259 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1965), wherein it 
was said: 
[W]hen the sheriff seizes property in the possession of a conditional vendee, he takes 
it subject to the rights and obligations of the conditional vendee and cannot sell the 
right to possession if, prior to the sale, there is a default in payment. . . . 
To hold otherwise would allow a sheriff to acquire greater property rights 
against the conditional vendor than the conditional vendee had. 
Id. at 252, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 213 (citation omitted). 
More than one commentator agrees with this rationale: 
Upon default, the secured party's basic protection is his ability to dispose of the 
collateral and satisfy the debt from the proceeds. Allowing the execution to proceed 
increases the costs to the secured party who then must follow the collateral into the 
hands of the new purchaser. If there is to be a liquidation, it makes sense to allow the 
secured party to repossess and dispose of the collateral; vacating the levy accom­
plishes this result. 
Henderson, supra note 79, at 207-08; see also J. White & R. Summers, supra note 13, § 26-7, at 
977 (secured party should not be denied right to control sale "merely because 9-311 states that the 
'debtor's rights' may be transferred"); Nickles, supra note 112, at 218-31 (using pre-UCC 
common law, pre-UCC recording statutes, and 9-201 to justify the senior secured party's 
control); Note, Securing the Antecedent Debt of the Failing Retail Merchant Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 1546, 1557 (1968) (noting that such a theory would not disrupt 
the junior secured party's rights under 9-311). But see Ward, supra note 79, at 230 ("On balance 
it seems preferable to restrict the secured party's ability to upset a levy to those situations where 
his possessory rights arise before levy."). 
Harrison Music Co. v. Drake, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 637 (Allegheny Co. Ct. C.P. 1967); 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Ass'n, 82 Wis. 2d 5, 261 N.W.2d 127 
(1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 34 Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W.2d 548 
(1967); see also Nickles, supra note 5, at 521-23 (necessity of default for conversion action to lie). 
In Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), the sheriff 
was allowed to conduct the sale. This decision makes sense only if no event of default had 
occurred, a point as to which the opinionls silent. 
137 jjj William Iselin, the default existed at the time of the levy, but in General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Maloney, 46 Misc. 2d 251, 259 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1965), the default 
did not oceur until three weeks after the levy. In both cases, the right of the secured party to 
repossess was upheld, proving that the sequence of levy and default is irrelevant to the secured 
party's right to repossess. See William Iselin^ 52 Misc. 2d at 824, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 663; see also 
Ford Motor Co. v. City of New York, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1974) (default after levy did not defeat secured party's right to repossess). But see Ward, supra 
note 79, at 230. 
It is not impossible to derive a contrary rule from First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee 
County, 34 Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W.2d 548 (1967). The report in that ease was unclear as to 
whether default had occurred between the time of the levy and the replevin action brought by 
the secured party. The court stated broadly, "where ... a debtor has the right to possession of 
the collateral and the sheriff seizes the collateral on execution against him, the secured creditor 
may not intervene by replevin in an attempt to take possession of the property." Id. at 541, 149 
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does not step in to prevent the sale^^®), the sheriff may sell the goods as 
encumbered by the senior security interest."® Thereafter, any future 
right of the secured party to repossess after the debtor's default may be 
exercised against the purchaser of the encumbered property. 
N.W.2d at 550-51. This result is defensible if the secured party had no right to repossess at the 
time of his replevin action, but the language barring replevin where there is postlevy default 
seems unjustifiable. The secured party's interest will survive the sheriff's sale, at which point the 
collateral is subject to repossession if the debtor defaults. See Platte Valley Bank v. Kracl, 185 
Neb. 168, 174 N.W.Sd 724 (1970). If the secured party's repossession is inevitable after the sale, 
what is the sense of allowing the sale to go forward? 
"8 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Pathological & Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 386 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972). One commentator assumes that where the secured party 
has the right to repossess but declines to exercise it, the sheriff may not proceed with the sale. 
Accordingly, this commentator reads the decision in First Nat 1 Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee 
County, 34 Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W.2d 548 (1967), as 
allowing secured parties to block any execution process against their collateral. This 
effectively insulates the debtor's equity in the collateral from its creditors other than 
the secured party. As long as the secured party does not exercise its rights to take 
possession of the collateral and dispose of it, the debtor will be able to continue 
holding and using it. Meanwhile, the judgment creditor may be unable to collect its 
judgment. 
Justice, supra note 78, at 439. Section 9-311 must mean, however, that unless the secured party 
actually asserts his rights after default, the sheriff is free to levy and sell, and the purchaser takes 
the property subject to the security interest. See Nickles, supra note 112, at 259-61. The levying 
sheriff has a right of possession that is superior to the debtor's right, even if inferior to the 
postdefault right of the secured party. 
It may be noted that a senior secured party has no affirmative duty to enforce a security 
interest on behalf of a junior creditor. William Iselin, 52 Misc. 2d at 824, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 663. 
But see Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8 (Del. 1972) (senior 
secured creditor was foreclosed by sherifFs sale for the benefit of junior lien creditor, implying a 
duty of the senior secured party to take affirmative action). 
"9 The sheriff's ability to sell the collateral after default on a third party's senior security 
interest, see supra note 138, is denied in states that characterize the sheriff's sale as a conversion 
of the secured party's rights. For instance, in Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 
(1971), a sheriff levied property encumbered by a security interest that was in default. Upon 
hearing of the pending sale, the secured party protested to the judgment creditor, but was 
ignored. The sale produced the usual disappointing price. Because the sheriffs sale constituted a 
conversion, the judgment creditor was liable for the market value (not the sales price) of the 
collateral "wrongfully" levied. If the decision is comprehensible, it is only because the security 
agreement was in default, the fact of default was communicated to the judgment creditor as part 
of the protest, and the secured party manifested his intent to take immediate possession of the 
collateral for disposition under part 5 of Article 9. Had the secured party not so protested, the 
sheriff should have been free to conduct the sale. The senior security interest would have 
survived the sale, and the right of repossession would have been exercisable against the buyers. 
Even though the court found that the sheriff wrongfully refused to halt the sale, no 
conversion action should have lain. The senior security interest could still be enforced against the 
property in the hands of the purchaser. No prejudice to the senior secured party's rights exists 
under this analysis, and such prejudice is at the heart of a conversion action. See Justice, supra 
note 78, at 441-43; Nickles, supra note 112, at 268; accord Hull v. Carnley, 11 N.Y. 501 (1854). 
On the other hand, if the purchaser at the sheriffs sale disappears with the goods and cannot be 
found, an argument for conversion liability against the purchaser can be made. See Nickles, 
supra note 112, at 264-68. 
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These rules, sensible enough when the security interest is senior to 
the judicial lien under which the sheriff acts, should not apply where 
the security interest is junior. Suppose that a receiver is appointed 
while a security interest is unperfected.'^" Before the receiver obtains 
the collateral, the secured party declares a default, repossesses the 
collateral (thereby perfecting his interest by possession'"'), and com­
mences the sale procedure. In the impending sale, the senior judicial 
lien creditor has no right to share in the distribution. Accordingly, he 
would much prefer that the receiver administer the sale. The state 
courts should be prepared to vindicate the receiver, in such a case, and 
order a turnover to the receiver. The William Iselin case should be 
limited to security interests with seniority over the competing judicial 
lien.'"^ 
One commentator fears that William Iselin cannot be so limited, 
and thus that a junior secured party might divest the sheriff of the 
collateral, even when the sheriff acts for a judicial lien creditor who is 
senior.'"3 However, it might as well be argued that William Iselin 
gives a junior secured party sufficient power to take control of the sale 
from a senior secured party. Nothing in the UCC mediates between a 
senior and a junior secured party who each claim a superior right of 
possession. The best answer to such disputes is that seniority and 
juniority extend beyond the right to proceeds of sales; they cover the 
right of possession as well. Therefore, the senior interest, whether it be 
a security interest or a judicial lien, should have the prior right of 
possession and the accompanying power to control the sale.'"" 
Appointment of a receiver renders the creditor for whom he acts senior to unperfected 
secured parties. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b), (3). 
In re Crosby, 19 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Chapman, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1968); Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459P.2d467 (D. 
Alaska 1969); see U.C.C. § 9-305. 
In support of the sheriff s right to sell when the judicial lien is superior is Beef & Bison 
Breeders, Inc. v. Capitol Refrigeration Co., 105 Misc. 2d 275, 431 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
There, the sheriff had levied, and the unperfected secured party sought to block the sale. 
Significantly, the court's sanction of the sheriffs sale was based entirely upon the execution lien's 
seniority under section 9-301. 
H3 supra note 79, at 229. Professor Ward properly recognizes this possibility as a 
threat to the priorities set forth in section 9-301. 
Professor Ward wonders whether UCC section 9-201 ("Except as otherwise provided by 
this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against 
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.") compels a court to award control of the sale 
to a secured party even when his interest is junior to a competing judicial lien. Id. at 231. 
Earlier, it was argued that section 9-301(l)(b), which makes the lien creditor's "rights" senior to 
those of the unperfected security interest, incorporates by reference a lien creditor's rights under 
nonuniform lien law. Among these rights is the right to have the sheriff seize property that could 
be used to satisfy a money judgment. This should take care of Professor Ward's concern about the 
effect of section 9-201. 
